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ABSTRACT
Was former Yugoslavia an artificial creature and what are the reasons behind its creation? 
Has Kosova/o and its majority population the right to self-determination, meaning 
independent statehood as the former Yugoslav republics? What was the role of Serbian 
nationalism in the creation and dissolution of former Yugoslavia? These are some of the 
core issues we have discussed here which enabled us to fully understand former 
Yugoslavia’s nightmare.
Kosova/o and Albanians living in former Yugoslavia were the most discriminated nation 
in the State. In the period between the two Wars, they had not even been treated as a 
minority. Only after 1974 they became, for the first time, players in the balance-of-power 
game within the Communist Yugoslavia. Yet, they were mostly misused by other Slavic 
republics in the fight to control the Serbian aggressive nationalism and hegemony.
After the dissolution of former Yugoslavia and long before that, the Kosovar Albanians 
are striving for achievement of the right to independent statehood. Althought the right is 
asked for the recognition by peacefull means on the part of the Kosovar Albaninas, it has 
so far been denied by the Belgrade regime. Long time of waiting for the right to be 
realised produced the clandestine Kosova/o Liberation Army (KLA, or, in Albanian: 
U(^K) that appeared on the scene after the Dayton Accords (1995). It remains to be seen 
how the issue will be settled in the time to come.
iv
ÖZET
Eski Yugoslavya suni bir oluşum mudur ve onun ortaya cıkmasısm ardındaki temel 
nedenler nelerdir? Kosova halkının kendi geleceğini belirleme hakki var mıdır? 
Yugoslavya Devleti’nin dağılmasında Sırp milliyetçiliğinin rolü nedir? Yukarıda ki 
sorularin cevapları bu çalışmada bulunmaya çalışılmıştır ve şurası kesindir ki bu 
cevaplar bizim Yugoslavya karabasanını daha iyi anlamamıza yardım etmiştir.
Eski Yugoslavya’da yaşayan Kosovah Amavutlar Yugoslavya Devleti içinde en fazla 
ayrımcılığa maruz kalmış millettir. İki savaş arası dönemde onlar bir azınlık olarak 
bile görülmemişler, yalnızca 1974’ten sonra komünist Yugoslavya içinde denge 
politikasında bir aktör olarak belirmeye başlamışlardır. Fakat yine de onlar diğer 
slavik kökenli cumhuriyetler tarafından saldırgan Sırp milliyetiliği ve hegemonyasına 
karşı verilen mücadelede kullanılmaktan kendilerini alamamışlardır.
Yugoslavya Devleti’nin dağılmasından çok önceleri başlayan ve dağılmasıyla hız 
kazanan bir şekilde Kosovah Amavutlar bağımsız devlet hakkı için mücadele 
etmektedirler. Bu hak, hemekadar Kosovah Amavutlarca barışçı yollardan kabul 
ettirilmeye çalışılmışsa da Suplar tarafından kendilerine tanınmamıştır. Uzunca bir 
müddet bu hakkın gerçekleştirilmesi için verilen mücadelerle geçtikten sonra, 1995 
Dayton Anlaşmalarını takip eden süreçte yeni ve gizli bir oluşum ortaya çıkmıştır: 
Kosova Kurtuluş Ordusu. Bu somnun önümüzdeki yıllarda nasıl çözüleceğini görmek 
için hala bekliyomz.
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CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION
The dissolution of former Yugoslavia represents the most significant event following the 
end of Cold War. The aim of this dissertation is to give an overview of the factors that led 
to its violent break up. To achieve this, one must take into account the background that 
was behind former Yugoslavia’s creation in December of 1918. It is Second Chapter in 
which there are given these brief historical considerations. The rest of it involves 
discussion on the recent events after the end of Cold War up to the present.
Serbian nationalism has in our opinion been the main cause of former Yugoslavia’s 
violent break up in 1992. Its roots lie as far back as 1844, when Ilija Garasanin drafted a 
national program named “Nacertanije” (The Outline). We shall not discuss the program 
but only mention it so as to have a clear view on later Serbia’s national programs. Last of 
them was that drafted in a form of Memorandum by the Serbian Academy of Arts and 
Sciences in 1986. Serbian policy of mid-1980s based its actions with a view of 
territorially expanding to the detriment of others on the 1986 Memorandum.
Albanians and Kosova/o between the two World Wars played no role in running former 
Yugoslavia. Only after the fall of Rankovic in 1966 (Serb origin interior minister of 
Yugoslavia) there were created some opportunities for Albanians to enter the balance-of- 
power game within that State. This is the reason why we have dwelt upon the issue of 
Kosova/o and Albanians in former Yugoslavia only after 1996 onwards. The 1974
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autonomy granted to Kosova/o offered the Kosovar Albanians an opportunity to check 
and balance Serbia’s aggressive behavior that marked State-running of former Yugoslavia 
all the time until its dissolution. Yet Kosova/o and Albanians were very often, if not 
always, sacrificed by others in former Yugoslavia when it came to preserve their interests 
vis-à-vis Serbia. Denying the full republican status to Kosova/o in 1974 could be well 
explained upon this logic, that is, the full republican status would have in a long run 
derailed the balance of power between Albanians and the South Slavs in the Balkans.
After the end of Cold War, former Yugoslavia had been heading for the opposite 
direction than the other Communist States of Europe. Milosevic’s coming to power in 
1987 and his playing with nationalist card rendered the reforms led by Croat Ante 
Markovic (the reform oriented Prime Minister of former Yugoslavia at the time) 
impossible. Within the political climate created in and by Serbia it was totaly unfeasable 
to follow the new trend in economic and political democratization of the country. After 
failed talks on the transformation of former Yugoslavia into a loose (con) federation 
(Summer 1991), Serbia continued its policy with violent means by attacking first 
Slovenia and then Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was expected that Serbia’s 
behavior would have implications for regional and wider stability which, in turn, brought 
into play the international community. Europe was the first to get involved in former 
Yugoslavia’s crisis, by setting up the guidelines on which to base solving of the crisis. 
Based on these guidelines, that related not only to former Yugoslavia but the Soviet 
Union as well, only the federal republics were granted the right to independent statehood.
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Former autonomous provinces were denied the right and this had impact on Kosova/o’s 
right to independent statehood. Furthermore, there have been comparisons of Kosova/o 
with the so-called “Republika Srpska Krajina” (Croatia) and “Republika Srpska” (Bosnia- 
Herzegovina), set up violently and by ethnically cleansing all the non-Serbs. Kosova/o 
issue is different, though, both legally and politically for what we discuss in the Second 
Chapter of the dissertation.
The two international conferences, held in the Hague (1991) and London (1992) 
respectively failed as a result of international community’s reluctance to military 
intervene against Serbs. Still they were in line with the guidelines as mentioned above. 
They did not allow for any forceful change in former republican borders. But they did 
menage to stop the fighting and war in the north and central parts of former Yugoslavia. 
The US involvement on the crisis came too late. Only when it came Serbi’s war of 
agression was put to an end (1995). These issues, that is, the beginning of the peace 
process in former Yugoslavia we discuss in Chapter 111 of the dissertation. The evolution 
of the attitude of international community and including the Kosova/o issue are to be 
object of discussion as well. We shall give here our remarks regarding the wrong 
application by the international community of the so-called uti possidetis principle and 
the impact it may have on the destiny of Kosova/o and its majority population, that is, the 
fear that we share that the way it was applied may give a free hands to Milosevic to 
ethnically cleanse Kosova/o in the name of preservation of RFY’s (Serbian and 
Montenegro) territorial integrity.
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Dayton Peace process as a comer stone in understanding the crisis in former Yugoslavia 
is going to be dealt with in the Chapter IV of the dissertation. In connection with the 
Dayton, there the “outer wall of sanctions” imposed on Serbia, not only because of the 
unsettled Kosova/o issue but as well to force Serbia in cooperating with the Hague War 
Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and to the full implementation of the Dayton 
Peace Accords. Yet, these issues would not be discussed since they are not related to our 
thesis. Kosova/o issue in connection with the “outer wall of sanctions” is discussed only 
to see if they had in any impact on peaceful solving of the Kosova/o crisis. We deem that 
this impact is not taking place. The appearance of the clandestine Kosova Liberation 
Army (U^K) on the political scene of Kosova (1995) bears witness to this. Among the 
Kosovar Albanian leadership, and its peaceful way pursued since 1990 to achieve its 
political aims for independence of Kosova/o there have emerged different streams. One 
of those is that Kosova/o issue should be settled by force for the “Repubilka Srpska” in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was set up in that way. Still, the peaceful stream among the Kosovar 
Albanian leadership dominates the scene, but it may not be for too long. This our 
conclusion we draw being based on Serbian repressive policies pursued in Kosova/o ever 
since the autonomy was abolished in 1989.
The status of Kosova/o is one of the most discussed issues today. Can it be an autonomy- 
type of entity as it was according to the 1974, or it should be a third republic within the 
transformed FRY (Serbia and Montenegro)?!. Both of them, we hold, are untenable 
solution for Kosova, if it is to be solved once forever and in a long rung for the sake of
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peace and stability in the Balkans and wider. First reason is the mere fact that Kosovar 
Albanians are not ethnic Slavs which as well could not live in one State with Serbia. 
Second is that Kosova/o, as one of eight former Yugoslavia’s territorial entities, must 
have the same rights, that is, full independence from Serbia. Third has to do with 
Montenegrin population that is twice smaller than the Kosovar Albanians but still enjoys 
a republican status. It also does not want to live with Serbia. The ongoing events in 
Montenegro show this. It is obvious that Serbs have not displayed any understanding for 
living with other non-Serbian cultures and peoples. Lastly, we consider that if there is a 
security reason, as it seems to be the case, for not granting to Kosova/o the right to 
independent statehood, than as time moves on there would be clearer to anyone that 
exactly that stability will be more threatened if Kosova/o remains within Serbia’s 
jurisdiction, or within FRY’s (Serbia and Montenegro) to that matter. All these arguments 
are discussed in the fourth Chapter.
Chapter V is reserved for our conclusions regarding all the above issues, with Kosova/o 
as its central part. Following the conclusion there are endnotes for each chapter and 
literature used in writing the dissertation.
Note that we use in this work, for the sake of impartiallity, both Ablanian and Serbian 
spelling of the name, that is, Kosova/o.
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CHAPTER II: BREAK UP OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND THE ATTITUDE 
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
1. Genesis of the Yugoslav Break-up and Emergence of the Kosova/o Issue
The part we diccuss comprises two issues: first, it deals with the very roots of former 
Yugoslavia’s creation in 1918, while the second regards the emergence of the Kosova/o 
issue itself The latter, it should be noted, is of recent origin and dates back to the 1960s, 
that is, after the fall of Rankovic (Serb origin interior minister of former Yugoslavia). 
This is not to say that Kosova/o issue had not earlier been an important problem to be 
solved , especially during and immediately after the Second World War. The point lies on 
the fact that only after the fall of Rankovic, Albanians as a whole became for the first 
time one of the active players in the political scene of the than Yugoslavia. It was due to 
the overall political climate created at the time. Than Kosova/o became one of 
Yugoslavia’s core issues, nyway, in both cases Kosova/o and Albanians were not the 
cause of Yugoslavia’s violent break-up. Rather, they were as a ground on which the very 
survival of the socialist Yugoslavia was tested, while the main cause for its violent break­
up rests with the Serbo-Croatian relationship and their different perception of the 
“Yugoslav idea”, on the one hand, and Serbia’s exclusivist and aggressive nationalism 
vis-à-vis the others, on the other.' We refer here to as “Serbia’s aggressive and 
exclusivist nationalism”, since it was Serbs the only ones whose political and other 
activity had all the time been based on a national program.
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Formation of the Yugoslav state on 1 December 1918 and its constitutional structure 
based on royal unitarism after 1921 (the Constitution of Vidovdan) represented a victory 
of the Serbian political forces over the others. Such a political force had been as an 
immediate result of the balance of forces in which case the Serbian political factor was a 
dominant one.^ This domination was both in internal (because it was the Serbian army as 
the only regular force) as well as in international affairs (Serbia’s allies were the 
victorious party in the War and shaped the post-War European order).^ As for Serbia’s 
national aims, creation of the Serbian-Slovene-Croat Kingdom, later renamed Yugoslav, 
represented almost a full realization of their national program. Towards the others, it 
opened the issue of the Serbian hegemony as a result of complete Serbian control of its 
state structures'* This state of affairs lasted all the time former Yugoslavia existed, 
notwithstanding a common saying of the time that “creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 had 
been an act of solution of the national question of the South Slavs, with the exception of 
Bulgarians’’.^  The fact is that its creation in 1918 represented the very denial of the 
existence of the national question of Croats, Albanians, Macedonians and the others
Croats, one of the founders of that state, perceived Yugoslavia as a federation. It was 
quite the opposite from the Serbian unitarist view of the problem.’ Felt betrayed, Croats 
never ceased to searching for the ways to redefine the common state. This eventually led 
to the royal authoritarianism of 1929. That was a prelude to its violent break-up in 1941, 
after German invasion. Setting up of the so-called “hrvatska banovina’’ on the eve of the 
Second World War was too little too late to upease the Croatian national feelings.
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During the War time none but the Serbs defended the “Yugoslav idea”. Against this 
background, for nearly forty years, from 1943 to 1980, Yugoslavia was recreated and 
guided by the firm hand of President Josip Broz Tito. Before we proceed with the post­
war period and the emergence of the Kosova/o issue, let us see the position of the 
Albanians during the royal Yugoslavia.
After the Balkan Wars, Albanian lands were divided between Greece, Montenegro, 
Serbia and the newly created Albanian state on 28 November 1912. London Conference 
of Ambassadors in 1913 decided that Kosova/o and other majority Albanian-inhabited 
lands in today’s Macedonia be given to Serbia. During the Serb-Slovene-Croat Kingdom 
and later the royal dictatorship, the territory of Kosova/o remained an administrative part 
of that state without any specific legal status, that is, the Albanians were not recognized 
even as a national minority.® The Serbs argued that non-recognition of the Albanian 
problem lies on the fact that the territories annexed after the Balkan Wars cannot be part 
of the minority protection as foreseen after the First World War.’ Albanians, together 
with the Muslims and Macedonians, were the most oppressed people. After the chaos of 
the years of the World War I, the new Yugoslav state attempted to re - colonize the 
territory with new Serb settlers, the Serb-Croat language was compulsory in schools and 
for all official purposes. In the inter-Wars period an estimated 40,000 Slav peasants 
(mostly Serbs and Montenegrins) moved in Kosova/o while over half a million Albanians 
were forced to e m i g r a t e . F o r  the final solution of the “Albanian question”, there
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was eventually drafted a plan “The Expulsion of the Amauts” (Albanians) by the Serbian 
Academician Vasa Cubrilovic (1937). Its implementation, though, was intercepted as a 
result of the events following the Second World War"
During the Second World War, Kosova/o had been a part of the Albanian Kingdom 
created by Italy and Germany. In the years 1943-44, some handful communists attempted 
to gather in order to ask the unification of Kosova with Albania. This eventually failed, 
and the uprising in Kosova/o occurred in 1944. It could be crushed dawn only in late May 
1945 by the Communist troops. Then Tito had Kosova/o labelled as a “war zone” in early 
February of that year. An “assembly” of Kosova/o (composed of Communists) decided 
that Kosova/o should join “Federal Serbia” in July 1945. The decision later served as a 
basis for constitutional dogmatic exercise of the “free will”, that is, of the right to self- 
determination of the Kosovar Albanians and, in turn, demmed an act of unification with 
the Yugoslav Federation.'^
The main difference in Kosovar Albanians position with the pre-War Yugoslavia was that 
this time their official status had been recognized by the 1946 Constitution, although the 
policy of mass expulsion and repression continued unabated until 1966.'^ After Rankovic 
fell in 1966, Serbs and Montenegrins lost their dominance over Kosova/o’s political and 
administrative apparatus and Albanian dissatisfaction was allowed to be freely aired with 
large - scale demonstrations in November 1968. There were called for Kosova/o to be 
granted republican status. To grant such a republic was officially seen as being merely the
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first Stage towards the unification of Kosova/o, and other regions inhabited by Albanians, 
especially in Macedonia, with neighboring Albania. But the fact is that until the collapse 
of the last openly Stalinist regime in the world in neighboring Albania in 1991, the 
Albanians of Kosova/o always faced the undesirability of secession. The poverty and 
oppression of Enver Hoxha’s Albania were even less attractive than Serbian 
domination.'"'
Constitutional amendments in 1968 granted the region of Kosova/o some republican 
prerogatives and this was confirmed in the Constitution of 1974. Positive trends in 
Kosova/o, for the first time, were obvious: institutional basis of Kosova/o was 
strengthened and completed; the University of Prishtina was formed and a number of 
state, educational, cultural and informative institutions had been cut off from the Belgrade 
regime and put under direct control of the political and administrative power of 
Prishtina.'^ Nontheles, Tito did not grant a full republican status for Kosova/o since it was 
contrary to the very idea, definition and the practice of a nation-building as it applied in 
all former Communist countries. On this we turn later again. Tito himself preferred a 
very careful and gradual improvements in Kosova/o so that by the end of the 1970s, the 
controlled autonomy of Kosova/o had finally been widened significantly.'* Economic 
integration of Kosova/o into former Yugoslavia and its development and prosperity, it 
was believed, would be enough, together with other Titoist postulates of socialism, to 
satisfy the Albanian national aspirations.‘’The demand of the Kosovar Albanians for their 
own republic has roots in the awakening of a sense of intense national pride which until
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long ago was denied to them, though tolerated in other Yugoslav nationalities. The spring 
explosion of 1981 is in many ways a product of this delayed consummation of national 
equality and rights. Their size and ethnic compactness were, in the eyes of the Albanian 
population, sufficient reason for changing Kosova/o’s status from that of a province into 
the full republican one.'* If Croatian nationalism and its political consequences 
represented all the time the principal threat to the integrity and stability of former 
Yugoslavia, by the 1970s Kosova/o had become the loci of new ethnocentric malaises 
and a new serious actor in the power balance of the than Federative Yugoslavia.
It was in Kosova/o that for the first time the police had used fire arms in 1981 against 
demonstrators. The brutal response to the political demands of the Kosovar Albanians 
was a sign of a collective Slav guilt towards this most impoverished non-Slav part of the 
former Yugoslavia^“ It must be admitted , however, that the Serbian political and cultural 
leadership used the Kosova/o riots of 1981 as an excuse for the revival of their centuries 
old national program that was drafted again in 1986 by the Serbian Academy of Sciences 
and Arts.^' From this time onwards, the Memorandum had been waiting the appropriate 
time and executor. It was Milosevic who was deemed the most apt person for this and, 
again, it started in Kosova/o at the end of 1980s.^  ^Before we turn on the next chapter, I 
shall discus in brief the ideological background on which the so - called “ political- 
territorial autonomy” of Kosova/o and the denial of its full republican status were based. 
Based on communist theory and practice, the “ right to secession ” was understood as
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being reserved only for the federal-type republics, while the others without such a 
political-organizational status were denied the right. The latter were entitled only to the 
“political-territorial autonomy”. This practice existed in former Communist countries 
and served as a basis for arbitrary decision on who is a nation and who is not.'^ According 
to this logic, there had been “created” new nations (like is the case with Slav 
Macedonians and Muslim Bosniacs), while those who had already been established as a 
nation were denied the very existence (like is the case with Jewish nation during Lenin’s 
time, Cherkez nation, Albanians in the former Yugoslavia etc.). For this category, it was 
argued, “political-territorial autonomy” was the only status they could reach. This was a 
theoretical background. But, it should be noted, in essence it was a camouflage, as it has 
been and still is a ridiculous justification that there cannot be two States from one nation, 
or two “Albania” as it used to be said for Kosova/o case. The fact is that the denial of 
republican status for Kosova/o than, and the independent statehood at the present, have its 
roots on security matters, the fact admitted as far back as 1982 by the then Interior 
Minister of Yugoslavia, the Slovene Stane Dolane.^“*
This is not to say that politically Kosova/o , despite its legal position, did not play its role 
in the balance of power system within the former Yugoslavia. The difference between 
Kosova/o and the others in former Yugoslavia consisted in the fact that it had all the time 
until the dissolution of Yugoslavia been used to check Serbia’s aggressive intentions. 
When Yugoslavia’s dissolution started, it was clear that Serbia was in its way to 
implementing the National Program of Greater Serbia (especially from 1989 onwards),
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and its centralist tendencies became clearer than ever before.25
2. Tracing the Break-up and the Main Events Leading to the Conflict in Former 
Yugoslavia and its Violent Dissolution
In recent writings of the various authors regarding the dissolution of former Yugoslavia 
and the events leading to it, there could be found a detailed elaboration of the genesis of 
Yugoslavia’s break-up. It goes as far back as 1918, which is a right finding since in that 
date it started the fomentation and institutionalization of the Serbian hegemony over the 
others, first against the Croats and Slovenes and, later, against all former 
Yugoslavia’s ethnic communities. Based on this fomentation and institutionalization, in 
the mid-1980s, when a process of democratization started within former Communist 
countries, the Serbian nationalism embarked on the revival of its old idea of Greater 
Serbia drafted long time ago by Ilija Garasanin (1844). This revival was deemed 
necessary by the Serbs since they were feeling “endangered” by the new political reality 
established in the then Yugoslavia and by the international environment that was being 
ramified.^*’ Ups and dawns of the post-War Yugoslavia in economic, political, legal and 
cultural sphere created all the preconditions for the Serbian aggressive nationalism to 
come to the fora, which was sanctioned in 1986 in the famous Memorandum of the
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts .27
Paradoxically though, Kosova/o and Albanians were used as a pretext to prove the
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“Titoite plot” against Serbs, in a time when Albanians as a whole were the less 
represented in State and political structures of Communist Yugoslavia and their 
autonomy was about formal.^* Yet, Kosova/o’s autonomy had to be abolished formally in 
its entirety at least for two reasons. First, it was needed in order to teach a lesson for 
eventual dissobeyance on the part of other republics and, second, to have Kosova/o’s 
formal vote against the others because the Serbs were highly convinced that Yugoslavia 
would never cease as easy to exist so that they could blackmail the others freely. In the 
mid-1980s, when asked about the future of Yugoslavia, a Serbian had told a Washington 
Post’s journalist that Yugoslavia would never cease to exist.^  ^This was the Serbian mind­
set and their spiritual state on which the Memorandum had been based and on which it 
counted too much. This too explains Milosevic’s coming to power so easy. '^’ With this 
state of affairs, Kosova/o of 25th April 1987 became the date of self-destruction of 
former Yugoslavia, a date when formal execution of the war-preparations.^' Dragisa 
Pavlovic, head of the Belgrade communists, on the occasion of his revocation from the 
post in September 1987 (the famous 8th Session of the Belgrade communists) warned 
that Serbs could very easily come into the conflict with the others if they were to insist on 
living within one State^^ In fact, these words uttered by Dragisa Pavlovic showed the 
very exclusivist and aggressive nature of the Serbian nationalism and its quest for 
territorial expansion, the dangers and consequences it would have in the years to come for 
regional and wider stability ”
Western and other interpretations of the causes, motivations and the nature of the conflict
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in former Yugoslavia vary from one author to the other. Nevertheless, as we have seen 
earlier in this work, it was a war for territorial conquest carefully prepared and conducted 
by Serbia’s leadership. Unfortunately, the international response has not been along these 
lines which, in turn, left a more room for its very careful and cunning preparation by the 
Belgrade regime. This preparation process for the conflict and the war in former 
Yugoslavia had been completed approximately by April-May 1990 and comprised 
psychological, institutional, economic, propagandistic and military preparations for war, 
or wars, as the case might be.
Serbian intellectuals in the mid 1980s created a critical mass of prejudice, ethnocentrism, 
and war-mongering that made possible Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to power and which 
created the mass psychological preconditions for aggression against Slovenes, Albanians, 
Croats, and Muslims. Anti-Albanian pamphlet published in Praxis by Serb intellectuals, 
after Memorandum represented a second most influential paper. Its aim was to support 
the allegedly Serbian social and political discrimination that was never proved 
empirically. It did suffice that Belgrade based press and media supported such allegation 
of Serb discrimination in Kosova/o and elsewhere in former Yugoslavia.^“' First 
promotion of this psychological preparation and war hysteria and, consequently, 
implementation of the dream of Greater Serbia, occurred on 25 April 1987 in Fushe 
Kosove ( In Serbian: Kosovo Polje). On this date Milosevic made his famous promise to 
the Serbs by saying that “No one has the right to beat You up’’.^  ^ The final phase of this 
psychological preparation was the end of 1989 when under the auspices of the Orthodox
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Church of Serbia and approved by the Serbian authorities, there had been dug up the 
purported bones of Tsar Lazar of Serbia. In an earnest parody of a medieval cult, Lazar’s 
bones were carried aroimd Serbia to summon up the true spirit of Serbdom before being 
reburied.
The legal-institutional preparations for conflict and the war of aggression were carried out 
between 1988 and 1990. It began with unilateral abolition of the autonomous provinces 
of Kosova/o and Vojvodina during 1989 - 1990, and continued with institutional 
usurpation or paralysis of the federal state and political institutions (Central Committee 
of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Collective Presidency of SPRY, diplomatic 
representations , TANJUG, the Central Bank etc.). Stipe Mesic, who was to be the 
Croatian rotating president of the Collective Presidency, was blocked by Serbia and its 
satellites (Montenegro, Kosova/o and Vojvodina) in May 1991. This marks the end of 
institutional destruction of the former Yugoslavia.^’ In the constitutional sense, on the 
other hand, the unilateral changes to the status of Kosova/o and Vojvodina mark the 
beginning of the process of Yugoslavia’s violent disintegration. It marked the begimiing 
of the radical change in the balance of power between the federal units of the former 
Yugoslavia with an open hegemony tendency on Serbia’s side.
The military preparation - political, strategic and operational - of the JNA (Yugoslav 
People’s Army), guided mostly by Serbs, for war began at its very inception, after Tito’s 
death, and were systematically conducted especially in the period between 1986-1990.^® It
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was not the ideology, but the Serbian National Program that drew the military leadership 
to the side of Slobodan Milosevic. The fact that from the beginning of 1980s all Serb- 
inhabited areas of the former Yugoslavia had been under the command of Belgrade Army 
headquarters was proved real when by the end of 1990 all arms that belonged to the 
territorial defense forces in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were seized by the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), an event that happened in Kosova/o right after the 1981 
riots^’ When the fighting broke out in Croatia (September 1991) and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(March -April 1992), the military openly sided with the Serbs in their effort to create a 
Greater Serbia.*'“
The economic preparation of the JNA and Serbia for war was conducted, as absurd as it 
may seem, during the reformist mandate of Ante Markovic. The refomis involved, 
specifically, making the Yugoslav dinar convertible and centralizing all values and 
foreign currency payments. This led to a flood of foreign currency into the National 
Bank. Serbian banks placed a large portion of the resultant foreign currency reserves in 
foreign countries, particularly in Cyprus, and throughout banks in Europe and America.*" 
The final act of Serbia’s economic preparation for warfare occurred in December 1990, 
when Milosevic’s regime, without the knowledge of the Central Bank, extorted § 2 
billion of the Yugoslav dinar’s hard-currency backing. Subsequently, all the resources of 
the Central Bank of the former Yugoslavia (foreign currency, gold, and other valuables) 
were used for financing the war.**^
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The international - political and diplomatic preparation of the aggression was insured by 
the very logic of the way in which the international community operated, inertia and an 
apologetic stance in favor of the status quo regarding international relations, - in which 
Yugoslavia played an important role during the Cold war -, guaranteed for Serbia an 
initial and abiding passivity on the part of the West’s approach to the aggression/^ 
Moreover, the domination of Serbs and Montenegrins in Yugoslavia’s diplomatic corps 
enabled the instantaneous serbianization of this body, transforming it into a crucially 
important diplomatic campaign team in support of aggression.
Serbia’s foreign relations strategy was very simple : leaning on all kinds of real and 
mythical historical alliances, whether ethnic (Russian) or those of “traditional friends’’ 
(France), those established through historical manipulation (demonization of Muslims as 
religious fanatics and Croats as Nazis), and the exploitation of the holocaust (Israel and 
the Jewish community), as well as those founded on political interests opposed to 
disintegration (Great Britain). Ironically, as the war progressed, it was the actions of the 
Serbs most closely mirrored what the Nazis had done to Jews during the World War
When looked at in retrospect, the “economic war’’ of December 1989 ( between Serbia 
and Slovenia), attempts at political and economic redefinition of the former Yugoslavia 
with Serbia and Montenegro opposing it fervently, aiming certainly at strengthening the 
federal structure, the independence efforts by Slovenia and Croatia ( March-June
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1991) , Macedonia and Kosova/o (September 1991), Bosnia - Herzegovina (March-April
1992) , all were undertaken as a result of Serbia’s aggressive plans against the others in 
former Yugoslavia.
3. Initial response of the International Community
In an article about former Yugoslavia published in Washington Post on 17 December 
1989, it was written, among others, that Observes say Milosevic is using Kosovo for 
a larger, unknown political purpose”.''^
This ignorance on the part of the West led to the highly inertive responses to the crisis at 
its very beginning. It would take some months of destruction in Bosnia and the 
revelation of concentration camps until the West discerned the real aims of Milosevic’s 
Serbia. Yet, the response never came as it should have, as it will be seen in brief This 
fact was skillfully used by Serbia to achieve, at least partly, its war aims, that is, the 
Serbian project to systematically create, through violence that included ethnic cleansing, 
the borders of a new, ethnically homogeneous set of contiguous territories.“'^ ’
Before the violence began, negotiations among the republics during the Spring of 1991 to 
achieve a loose federation of fully or semi sovereign states failed, apparently owing to the 
intransigence of the Serbian leadership, which had hitherto dominated the political and
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military structure of the Federation. The Croats and Slovenes wanted a loose federation 
that would dilute the Serbian influence, so did Bosnia and Macedonia, although their 
wishes were not so obvious at the time. The Serbians wanted a tighter federation to 
preserve its centralized control of the politics and economy and its dominant role in 
Yugoslav society
The support for maintaining the territorial integrity of the federation voiced by 
representatives of influential states and organizations, including the united States, the 
European Community (EC) and its members, and the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), undoubtedly strengthened Slobodan Milosevic in his 
perception that flexibility was not required in negotiations, since independence for 
Slovenia and Croatia was not being supported internationally.^’* Instead offering to accept 
a looser (con) federation, the Serbian leadership had the central army declare martial law. 
On June 21, 1991, the US Secretary of State, James Baker, while visiting Belgrade, 
strongly endorsed a declaration adopted two days earlier at the Berlin meeting of the 
CSCE, which expressed support for democratic development and (the) territorial integrity 
of Yugoslavia. '^® This US stance was later justified as if it was based on the ongoing threat 
that Yugoslavia’s dissolution could have had on the events in former Soviet Union and its 
eventual impact on Europe,^“ while Baker himself, in his book “Politics of Diplomacy: 
Revolution, War and Peace 1989-1992” (New York 1995), says that he had warned the 
than Yugoslav Premier, Ante Markovic, not to use force for protection of Yugoslavia’s 
borders. '^ The fact is that long service in Belgrade of the two of Baker’s advisers,
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Lawrence Eagelburger ( Deputy - Secretary of State) and Brent Scowcoaft ( National 
Security adviser) seems to have introduced a strong element of emotional commitment to 
the Yugoslav cause, as opposed to Western interests, which blinded them to see the real 
aims of Milosevic.^^
With this state of things and despite some early US warnings addressed to the Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes regarding their respective policies,” the Yugoslav People’s Army 
(JNA), with Ante Markovic still as a Prime Minister, left its barracks and attacked the 
provisional Slovenian militia on June 27, 1992. Major European powers ( especially 
Great Britain and France) remained bedeviled by national rivalries, so that the then EC 
(now European Union) and CSCE (now the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe) were not ready for the crisis in former Yugoslavia, a fact that was exploited by 
Milosevic to achieve its war aims.”
The members of the European Community were just about to start the final phase of 
negotiations leading up to the Maastricht Summit of December 1991. Nevertheless, the 
Community immediately involved itself in the crisis, reluctantly though and despite the 
fact that former Yugoslavia was not one of its members. Within seventy hours, a “troika” 
of EC Foreign Ministers (those of Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) mounted two 
rapid missions to Yugoslavia” The EC negotiators received repeated promises of cease­
fires, but violence erupted again as federal troops continued to consolidate their positions 
in Slovenia ”  Troika’s mission was proved to be just an excursion into peacemaking, and
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the “hour of Europe” in its worst sense was to be later witnessed by Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and its people. The European Council, at its scheduled meeting in Luxembourg, then 
called for an emergency meeting of the CSCE. Their own summit in Luxembourg 
was intended to lay the basis for the future European Union envisaged in the Mastricht 
Treaty signed six months later. It was proved psychologically difficult for the Twelve to 
adjust to the idea of a federal state collapsing before their eyes.
The then CSCE was just being transformed from a mechanism dedicated to maintaining 
crisis stability in Cold War Europe to a standing organization capable of offering 
procedures akin to collective security within Europe. In practice, of course, the CSCE and 
its “conflict prevention mechanisms” - a few unarmed men in suits with diplomatic 
passports and instructions to see all sides of the question - quickly renounced any role. 
Instead, in the highest tribute that one quango can pay to another, the CSCE effectively 
passed the parcel containing the true bomb to the European Community ”  In the 
meantime, a monitoring mission of fifty observers had been dispatched in the area, but 
hostilities broke out in Croatia, in particular in areas predominantly inhabited by Serbs. 
Serbian fighters in these regions were supported by the Yugoslav People’s Arniy (JNA) 
forces, who significantly increased their involvement in the crisis.
Despite the scale of the bloodshed in Croatia, the UN Security Council had remained 
inactive for exactly three months, and even when it met. Article 2(4) of the Charter was 
not invoked. There was no suggestion that an international act of aggression had taken
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place.^ ® The Council convened in response to requests from Austria, Canada, Hungary 
and, most crucially, Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav delegate opened the discussion and 
requested that a complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to 
all parties in Yugoslavia be adopted, i.e. he requested mandatory sanctions against the 
state he purported to represent. Its effects will be disastrous in the time to come, 
especially after 1992, when the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina started. The embargo was 
never lifted during all the time the war was going on.^  ^ This step of the former 
Yugoslavia’s diplomatic representative to the UN shows the pre-meditating plans for 
agression on the side of Serbia.'^ ® The United States delegation, uniquely, continued to 
classify the situation as one of “outright military intervention against Croatia” by the 
JNA. Secretary of State Baker, speaking for the United States, declared that “ the 
apparent objective of the Serbian leadership is to create a “small Yugoslavia” or a 
“Greater Serbia”... based on the kind of repression which Serbian authorities have 
exercised in Kosovo for several years...”. On 25 September 1991, when the arms embargo 
was imposed by Res. No.713.,®’ James Baker, on behalf of the US, EU and the CSCE, 
invoked all the international documents (the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and 
the UN Charter) in favor of non-changeability of internal and external borders by force. 
The Security Council then itself voted unanimously that “no territorial gains or changes 
within Yugoslavia brought about by force are acceptable”.®“ On these and other related 
issues we discuss later.
Initial response. It should be noted noted, to the former Yugoslav crisis was marked by
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non-preparedness of the West, espeeially Europe. Caught between Maastricht and the 
Soviet threat, Europe would provide enough space for Serbia’s plans to achieve territorial 
gains.*^  ^ It is only two West European figures, Mrs. Thacher and Alois Mock, who 
persistently warned of the dangers of violence in Yugoslavia.*^“* In these circumstances, 
the US was paralyzed to act effectively, since it was believed that the “hour of Europe” 
had come, and the Soviet government as well took a close interest in Yugoslav 
developments throughout the countdown to war. Then, after it started, it had not so much 
impact on the events, but its successor, the Russian government, owing to the European 
half-hatred support to the Serbian victims, would enter the scene by mid-1993 and take a 
role in the conflict that it did not deserve objectively.
4. The Hague Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and Its Impact on the 
Yugoslav Crisis
The Hague Peace Conference was convened as a result of a franko-german compromise, 
which means a beginning of Europe’s obvious disunity over the crisis and Serbia’s war 
aims clear ramification. It coincided with the fact that the CSCE soon reached the limits 
of its influence in the Yugoslav crisis so that the leading role in international mediation to 
the crisis was relinquished to the EC, whose good offices were accepted by all sides in 
Yugoslavia by mid-1991.
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By early July 1991, most of the German political parties were being convinced that the 
war in Slovenia was a war of aggression committed by Serbia, and demanded that the 
crisis be ended by recognition of those republics wishing to go out, thus 
internationalizing the crisis. This would open the way for international community to 
regard it in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This marks the beginning of 
the French-German cleavage over the war in Yugoslavia.®^
As events moved on, so the deep seated anti-German feelings among Chancellor Kohl’s 
colleagues in London and even more in Paris were to come to surface.®® It is against this 
background that a compromise was found in convoking the Hague Peace Conference on 
Yugoslavia and setting up the Badinter Committee (later the Badinter Commission). At 
this stage, it proved impossible any discussion in favor of military intervention to stop the 
coming tragedy in Yugoslavia, which gave clear signals to Milosevic that he could safely 
pursue his war goals. The work of the Conference and its arbitration Committee will 
serve as a guidance for the Greater Serbia, which could be seen by Serbia’s intransigence 
and its attitude towards the Conference’s work. Serbia treated it as a good offices and as a 
simple mediation effort, in both cases will no binding force for arbitration in the conflict.
Now we discuss the Hague Conference itself and the EC’s attitude on the eve of its 
establishment. On August 27,1991, the European Community and its member states, 
acting through an extraordinary ministerial meeting assembled in Brussels, expressed
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dismay at the increasing violence in Croatia, reminding “ those responsible for the 
violence” that the EC was determined “never to recognize changes of frontiers which 
have not been brought about by peaceful means and by agreement”. The statement 
deplored the Serbian irregulars’ resort to military means and the support given them by 
the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), calling on the “Federal Presidency to put an 
immediate end to the illegal use of the forces under its command”.*^
The Community further stated in its declaration of August 27, that it could not “stand idly 
by as the bloodshed in Croatia increases day by day” and it urged the parties to the 
conflict to accept a peace conference and the arbitration procedure. The peace conference 
was to bring together, “on the part of Yugoslavia”, the Federal Presidency, the Federal 
Government and the Presidents of the Republics. It accepted that “Yugoslavia” still 
existed as a state rather than a mere geographical description (“on the part of 
Yugoslavia”). Setting up of the Arbitration Committee headed by the French Judge, 
Robert Badinter, was much in line with international practice as applied to similar cases. 
It was to give its decision within two months.*®
The Hague Conference met at the Hague on September 7,1991, under he chairmanship of 
Lord Carrington. The mandate of the Conference had been refined by the EC, rather than 
by the parties to the conflict, in an EC ministerial declaration of September 3. It was “ to
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ensure peaceful accommodation of the conflicting aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples, 
on the basis of the following principles: no unilateral change of borders by force, 
protection for the rights of all in Yugoslavia and full account to be taken of all legitimate 
concerns and aspirations”.*’
There were twofold impacts of the Conference on the Yugoslav conflict, although by the 
end of 1991 it ended in failure with the peace-keeping as a substitute for military 
intervention to stop the war.^° First, the Arbitration Committee, as an organ of the 
Conference, in its first Opinion of 29 November 1991 clearly stated that the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution”, while the right to 
independent statehood belonged to the republics only and not to the peoples of former 
Yugoslavia. Second, by doing this, the Conference and the EC would give a clear signs 
on the impermissibility of internal border changes by force. These issues will be 
discussed later, since their clear ramifications will be seen in other Badinter’s opinions on 
the crisis. However, we should note here that on November 1991, on the initiative of 
Serbia there would be a question to the Conference regarding the two issues: first, who is 
entitled to self-determination and, second, whether the republican borders could enjoy 
international protection. These two questions showed the very nature of Serbia’s policy. 
These questions were the logical consequence of the Memorandum of the Serbian 
Academy of Sciences and Arts, in which there were provided the solutions that if 
Yugoslavia disintegrates than its borders should change s well in order to satisfy
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the Serbs and the Serbian mind-set that the internal borders were a Titoist plot against 
Serbia and the Serbs. In this sense it could be said that this stance of the Conference 
represents a first serious formal and legal blow to the Serb idea of Greater Serbia.’'
On the other hand, one could not help noticing that this served at the same time as a 
guiding point for further Serbian expansion in order to create territorial base for the new 
“republics”, first in Croatia and later in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by ethnically cleansing the 
non-Serbs. This was a result of a non-implementation force of the Conference’s decisions 
and the fact that other republics were as yet not recognized internationally. Hence, the 
German opinion that Serbia’s non-recognition of other republics construed as a validation 
of its policy of conquest seems now, as it did than, fully justified.” This German stance 
would shape, in common lines, the policy of recognition, that is, the policy of non­
recognition of the new entities created by force and through the policy of genocide and 
ethnic cleansing.”
5. The so-called “Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union” and their Impact on Former Yugoslavia
Even when the USA denounced Serbia as the aggressor in September of 1991, the 
accompanying message was that the USA, finding no strategic interest at the time, would 
not militarily intervene to stop the killing. In the mean time, as we saw, the EC was not 
prepared for military intervention either. Encouraged by this, the Serbian leadership
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escalated attacks on civilians in Croatia.
Later, with the change in geopolitical considerations (the break up of the Soviet Union) 
justifications for discouraging the democracy - and independence- seeking Yugoslav 
republics came to an end. In this contributed also Serbia’s intransigence to accept 
anything but centralized federation, or, its concept of Greater Serbia as the case may be. It 
is within this context that the EC made public its so-called “Guidelines on Recognition of 
New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union” on 16 December 1991. Austro- 
German pressure on the EC to recognize those republics wishing it, especially Slovenia 
and Croatia, played an important role.’"' The following will be the discussion of the 
background for their drafting ( October-December, 1991) and the impact on the shaping 
of the crisis in former Yugoslavia.
On 4 October 1991, the European Peace Conference issued a statement, after a meeting 
held at the Hague participating also the Presidents of Croatia and Serbia and the Federal 
Secretary for National defense, Veljko Kadijevic, in which the participants: “... Agreed 
that the involvement of all parties concerned would be necessary to formulate political 
solution on the basis of the prospective recognition of the independence of those 
republics wishing it, at the end of negotiating process conducted in good faith. The 
recognition would be granted in the framework of a general settlement and have the 
following components:
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a) , a loose association or alliance of sovereign or independent republics;
b) . adequate arrangements to be made for the protection of minorities, including human 
rights guarantees and possibly special status for certain areas;
c) . no unilateral changes in borders
This agreed statement for the first time formally admitted the possibility of secession but 
tied recognition of the prospective new state to the “framework of a general settlement”. 
On the same day, the Presidents of five of the six republics expressed their general 
agreement, with certain qualifications, to continue working on a draft paper prepared by 
Lord Carrington (Chairmen of the EPC), entitled “Arrangements of a General 
Settlement”. The arrangements spelled out the details of the envisaged framework 
agreement, which included commitments by the republics to protects human rights, 
referring to the Universal declaration of Human Rights, the International Human Rights 
Covenants, CSCE documents on the human dimension, and relevant Council of Europe 
instruments. Detailed provisions on human rights as “particularly applied to national or 
ethnic groups” were set forth, and a special status (autonomy) was to be established for 
areas in which a national or ethnic group forms a majority. In addition, provision was 
made for cooperation or consultation in trade, foreign affairs and security, and a customs 
union was envisaged.
The President of Serbia considered the paper unsuitable for detailed discussion.’*’ Similar 
reservations were put foreword by the Vice President who, since October 3, had been
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presiding over the then “rump presidency”, because, as he himself put it, the paper 
recognized the legality of unilateral secession A similar arrangement for the general 
settlement was nevertheless pursued further on October 25 , but the President of Serbia 
again maintained his reservations with regard to this proposed solution. The Community, 
in response, gave the parties until November 5 to indicate acceptance of the Carrington 
outline agreement. European draft sanctions were formally prepared by the end of 
October, providing for the suspension of cooperation agreements with Yugoslavia and 
trade concessions. The decisions were based on the finding that the Yugoslav Federal 
Republic no longer functions and the Federation itself, since 8 October, 1991 had been in 
the process of dissolution. However, a special regime was to be applied vis-à-vis parties 
contributing to the peace process. Serbia again refused to accept all these proposals and 
the sanctions were instituted. In addition, the Community asked the Security Council to 
impose an oil embargo and to adopt additional measures to enhance the effectiveness of 
its arms embargo.’®
This EC’s stance, that is, that the recognition of the independence of those republics 
wishing it “can only be envisaged in the framework of an overall settlement” was also 
supported by the UN Security Council. Namely, on 10 December 1991, in his letter, the 
Secretary General openly opted for the policy of general settlement.’‘’ But, it was unlikely 
that the general consent could be achieved as long as recognition depended on the 
agreement of all parties and since Serbia would, in effect, exercise its veto over the issue 
of recognition, thus frustrating the talks at the Hague.
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To overcome this stalemate, conditions for recognition were outlined in a common 
position of the EC on the above-mentioned “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States 
in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union”, adopted at the extraordinary EEC ministerial 
meeting in Brussels on December 16, 1991. These conditions allowed for progress to be 
made even in the absence of unanimity among the parties, but would still safeguard the 
essence of the Carrington proposal, as the republics were required to embrace its 
provisions unilaterally and to continue working towards collective agreement. The 
conditions were :
- respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the Commitments 
subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with 
regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights;
- guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with 
the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE;
- respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful 
means and by common agreement;
- acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non 
proliferation as well as to security and regional stability;
- commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse 
to arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and regional disputes.*“
The Community confirmed that it would not recognize entities that “ are the result of
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aggression”. It invited all Yugoslav republics to state by December 23 whether ; (1) they 
desired to be recognized as independent states; (2) they agreed to the commitments in the 
guidelines above; (3) they accepted the provisions of the Carrington, especially those on 
human rights and national or ethnic groups; and (4) they approved the involvement of the 
United Nations Secretary General and Security Council and continuation of the EC 
conference on Yugoslavia.
Finally, the Community and its member states required that, before achieving 
recognition, the Yugoslav Federal Republic pledge that it had no territorial claims against 
a neighboring EC state and that it would not use a name that implied such claims. This 
last requirement was inserted at the insistence of Greece, which suspected Macedonia of 
territorial ambitions.*'
Serbia objected strongly to these guidelines and named them as “an aggression against 
Yugoslavia” for they were the second blow to the plans of Greater Serbia. From these 
papers, it was clear that there will not be granted independence for those entities without 
the territorial base, that is, there will not be recognition of those entities created as a result 
of ethnic cleansing of other peoples. The Guidelines served as a stick in tenns of not 
validating the situations that were not in conformity with international law (genocide and 
ethnic cleansing of others in order to create a territorial base, as it was the case with 
“Republic of Krajina” in Croatia or “ Republika Srpska” in Bosnia-Herzegovina).*" Non-
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recognition, as an established rule in international law and as a means to invalidate the 
illegal uses of force with a view of achieving territorial gains, proved to be very effective 
and strong in the case of Serbs.®^
The decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia by Germany before the deadlines set forth 
in the Guidelines and, later, non-recognition of Macedonia ( although it fulfilled all the 
conditions for it) shows that they were not strictly respected. But, this was done as a 
result of Serbia’s intransigence and its pursuance of the aggressive nationalistic policy 
against the others in former Yugoslavia. It is this reason that Austro-German pressure and 
policy for the recognition of those republics wishing it should be viewed as a right step in 
a right direction and not as a cause of war, especially not as an incentive for “secession” 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia '^*
6. Impact of the ‘‘Guidelines” on the Kosova/o Issue
Quite at the beginning, it should be noted that the Guidelines did not touch upon the basic 
criteria for international statehood, that is, possessing of territory, population and a 
government in control of its territory and the population. The conditions for an 
international statehood were taken for granted, while the fulfillment of the criteria as 
foreseen in the Guidelines was designed to politically influence the events in the former 
Yugoslavia and to fit the EC’s interests. Their aim was to enable establishing the 
diplomatic relations with those entities which fulfilled the conditions set forth in the
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Guidelines and, at the same time, to punishing those who would not comply with them. 
Nevertheless, the actors of the crisis viewed them as a reference point for international 
statehood, that is, for their very state-being according to the rules of international law and 
relations.*^ Consequently, the applications submitted within the terms set forth in the 
Guidelines and the positive response to them had been viewed as a crucial stage in the 
process of nation (state) building and international subjectivity. This was true only for 
those entities with no clear territorial base, that is, for the governments in effective 
control of their population and territory that were achieved by the use of force (ethnic 
cleansing of the others with a view of forming the territorial base as one of the 
preconditions for international recognition of the sovereign statehood), as it was the case 
with the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.
Unlike other territorial entities of the former Yugoslavia, Kosova/o at the beginning of 
the crisis, no longer controlled its own police or territorial defense force as a result of a 
continuous Serbian policy of disarming all the Albanians while simultaneously anning 
ethnic Serbs and flooding the region with military forces sine 1987. When the crisis 
began, the Kosovar Albanians choose the policy of non-violence as a means of setting up 
the “parallel institutions” with the aim of challenging Serbia’s sovereignty over 
Kosova/o. By boycotting completely the Serbian ruled Kosova/o’s institutions since 
1989, the Kosovar Albanians left on Serbia the shame of occupying power, a fact
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noticeed as well by a foreigner traveling on the area.*  ^This state of occupation has so far 
been successfully challenged by the majority of Kosova/o’s population, especially after 
the beginning of former Yugoslavia’s break up and the subsequent establishment of 
Kosova/o’s own state and political institutions as opposed to Serbia’s.
The policy of developing “ parallel ” institutions began with Serbia’s suspension of the 
Kosova/o’s Provincial Assembly after the latter had proclaimed the “Constitutional 
Declaration on Kosova/o as an Independent and Equal Entity with the framework of the 
Yugoslav Federation/Confederation and as an Equal Subject with its Counterparts in 
Yugoslavia” on 2 July 1990. The Assembly continued to convene (except for Serb 
deputies, many of whom afterwards represented Kosova/o in the Serbia Parliament) and 
on 22 September 1991 it declared the Republic of Kosova/o. In the referendum organized 
by the Assembly and held on 26-30 September 1991, a full 99.87 per cent of those ho 
voted (turnout was 87 per cent due to a boycott by local Serbs) affirmed their desire for 
Kosova/o to be a sovereign and independent state.®’
The last time the assembly convened was on 2 May 1992 when it announced multy- 
party, general and Presidential elections for 24 May 1992. Elections to the 130-member 
Assembly resulted in the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) wining 76.4 % of the 
vote and getting 96 deputies; while the Parliamentary Party of Kosova/o (PPK) got 4.86 
% and has 13 deputies. Other successful parties were the Peasants’ Party of Kosova/o (7
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deputies) and the Albanian Christian Democratic Party ( 7 deputies ). In the Presidential 
election, Ibrahim Rugova, the popular and charismatic leader of the LDK, won by an 
overwhelming majority.
On December 1991, The Government of Kosova/o in exile, headed by the Prime Minister 
Bujar Bukoshi, handed over to the EPC its request for the international recognition of 
Kosova as an independent and sovereign state.** Although Kosova/o has always 
possessed and still possesses its own territory and population, the request for 
international recognition was denied for its political institutions which declared itself the 
representative of a majority of Kosova/o’s citizens did not posses coercive capacities. The 
Government of Kosova/o had no army or police force which it could deploy, that is, it 
was not a government in effective control of its territory and population.*’
As it will be seen later, the negative response from the Badinter Commission and its 
interpretation of the Guidelines treating Kosova/o’s issue on par with that of the so- 
called “Krajinska Republika” in Croatia and later with the “Republika Srpska” in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina” has been done for security reasons and not the legal ones. Kosova/o as 
ever since been viewed as an issue of human rights and self-determination within the 
framework of sovereign control by the Serbian government. ”
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CHAPTER III: BEGINNING OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE KOSOVA/O ISSUE
1. London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY, August 1992) and Its Goals
The Hague Peace Conference had been replaced by the London Conference on the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). The London Conference followed the two-days meetings in 
London on 26-27 August 1992. The main difference between the two bodies lies in their 
legal nature. In the first case, one has to deal with the “good offices” offered by the then 
EC and whose decisions were not binding, or were not supposed to be binding for the 
parties to the conflict. In the second case, though, due to the seriousness of the conflict in 
former Yugoslavia (Serbia’s aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina after the latter’s 
recognition by the EC (EU) - USA on 6 and 7 April 1992) respectively, the international 
community menaged to convene a new international conference on the already former 
Yugoslavia and whose decisions would be authoritatively binding for all the parties to the 
conflict. Its decisions were supposed to implement and enforce the UN Security Council, 
which it did not.'
The action of the Conference was based on the “work already done by the EC’s 
Conference on Yugoslavia, especially the documents already produced”.' There were 
included the Badinter’s Commission (previously named as Committee) Opinions issued 
during the January of 1992. On this we discuss later again.
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Except for the provisions regarding the cease-fire in the war tom areas, non-recognition 
of all the advantages achieved by force or fait accompli or any legal consequences 
thereof, the promotion of the right to self-determination, respect for the territorial 
sovereignty and independence of all states in the region, no change of borders by force, 
the “Statement on Principles” contained a very important provision. Namely, under the 
symbol ix, it was said, inter alia, that parties undertake a commitment to recognize each 
other mutually.^ It represented the last blow, from the standpoint of international law, to 
the plans for Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia rrespectively, that is, to the early made 
Serbo-Croatian plans for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the Karadjordjevo Plan 
between Milosevic and Tudjman, March 1991). The plan was later operationalized by 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Serbo-Croat leaders, Karadjic and Boban, in their meetings held in 
Austria (1992-1993).''
Politically, the London Conference was a lost opportunity. It showed a turning point and 
a sorry chapter in Western mishandling of the conflict^ The Conference produced a 
package of useful concrete agreements among the parties. If honored, these measures 
would have curtailed the fighting, ended atrocities, guarantied safe and effective 
humanitarian relief and set the stage for political negotiations. In the days and weeks 
that followed, the Serbs willfully ignored every accord reached and commitment made. 
This defiance drew no response from the West or the UN Security Council.
Western action after London Conference told once again the Serbs, and later the Croats,
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in unmistakable terms that there would be no intervention. The Serbs were further 
emboldened as it became clear that the British and French considered their UNPROFOR 
contingents virtual hostages and therefore sought to avoid provocations. This fact 
encouraged the Serbs to threaten these and other UN forces as a way to derail Western 
attempts to interfere with their ethnic cleansing of Muslim Bosniacs. Neither the United 
States nor any other power saw its vital interests imperiled by the conflict. The West had 
a political and moral interest in humanitarian relief and a strategic interest in containment 
of Serbia - and in fact the US and the EU (then EC) have so far been successful in 
protecting these two interests.
Despite its lofty aims and mechanisms, with no implementation force, the London 
Conference failed: The West was first divided and immobilized over the issue of 
recognition and, after the war in Bosnia broke out, also over the relief issues and the fear 
the conflict may spread to the South.*^  The Serbian war aims were being realized, and the 
Croatian to certain extent, well until the Bosnian Army launched in Summer 1995 its 
decisive offensive, which paved the way for the Dayton Peace Agreements of November 
that year. This offensive, it should be noted, was eased by the NATO - led military action 
against the Bosnian Serb Army early that year. The Dayton Agreements sanctioned the 
basic principles on territorial integrity and unity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina^
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2. Evolution of the Attitude of International Community with Respect of 
Recognition : Advisory Opinions of the Arbitration Commission within the ICFY 
( the Badinter Commission Opinions) and their Impact on the Overall Settlement 
of the Crisis in Former Yugoslavia.
Except for the first opinion of 29 November 1991, the Badinter Commission has rendered 
some other opinions that were of importance for the future ramifications of the crisis in 
the Former Yugoslavia.
The Commission was called upon to give its opinions from the various sides, first, it was 
called upon to give one opinion at the request of the Lord Carrington, President of the 
Peace Conference (Opinion No.l.). Similar requests were subsequently made, as 
mentioned earlier, by the Republic of Serbia using the Conference as intermediary 
(Opinions No.2 and 3 of lithe January, 1992) and the Council of ministers of the EC 
(Opinions 4 to 7 of 11th January, 1992 and 7 to 10 of 4th July, 1992). The Opinions from 
4 to 7 were delivered on the 14th of January 1991.** Finally, in July 1993, the 
Commission tackled the issue of the date when the succession to the former Yugoslavia 
occurred, for which we shall discus later (Opinions 11 to 13).
The Badinter Commission tackled in its first three opinions some general legal problems;
-41-
in the first, it discussed the question of whether the seceding republics could succeed to 
Yugoslavia and , if so , by virtue of which procedures ; in the second , it dwelt on 
the question, also discussed earlier, of whether the Serbian population in Croatia and in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina had a right to self-determination; the third opinion dealt with the 
questions as to whether the international boundaries between the Yugoslav Republics 
could be regarded as international frontiers (uti possidetis principle). In these opinions the 
Badinter Commission stressed the importance of the rights of peoples and minorities and 
even defined the norms that provided for these as part of jus cogens (binding in their 
nature).
The Opinions 4 to 7 were concerned with the question of whether the Republics of 
Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia, who had finally requested recognition by the 
Community and its member states, satisfied the conditions laid dawn by the Guidelines of 
16th December, 1991. In all four opinions, the Commission ascertained, whether or not 
referendums on independence had been held in each Republic, as well as whether each 
republic had committed itself to respecting the rights of individuals, groups and 
minorities. Whereas in the case of Croatia, in Macedonia and Slovenia it was found that 
all the requirements had been met (save the case of Macedonia’s name), in the case of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina it was emphasized that no referendum was held involving the whole 
population, since on 10 November 1991 it was held a plebiscite by the “Serbian people of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’’, which had opted for a “common Yugoslav state” and on 21 
December 1991 an “assembly of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina” had
-42-
adopted a resolution for the creation of a “Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina” and 
on 9 January 1992 the independence of this republic had been proclaimed. Due to this, on 
11 January 1992, the Badinter Commission concluded that Under these circumstances 
the expression of the will of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina to set up the Socialist 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent state could not be 
recognized as fully established”. Referendums, although held in the other republics, were 
not provided for as a precondition for recognition in the Guidelines, which represents the 
first evolution of the international community’s stance on the issue.
The Badinter Commission went on to say that this appraisal could be modified if 
“safeguards were established by the Republic” and i f “ necessary by way of a referendum 
in which all citizens of the Republic were to participate, under supervision”. It is apparent 
from the above that the arbitration Commission regarded the holding of an internationally 
monitored referendum, involving the whole population, as an indispensable element for 
granting of international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state. The 
Commission thus evaluated referendum to the status of a basic requirement for the 
legitimization of secession. Finally, on February 1992, a referendum was held: 64.4 per 
cent of the Bosnian population took part in the referendum, of which 99.7 per cent 
declared themselves in favor of independence. The overwhelming majority of the 
country’s Serb population, 31 per cent of the total, did not participate.’
From the dates already mentioned in the above opinion, it is quite clearly discerned that
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the Serbs were following carefully the reluctance of the EC (EU) to solve the crisis and, 
from the outset, it was sure that there would not be any military intervention . In this 
connection , there was a second important evaluation regarding the issue of 
recognition; On 23 December, 1991 Germany recognized Slovenia and Croatia 
unilaterally to show to the Serbs that they cannot indefinitely use the former Yugoslavia’s 
international subjectivity as a means too blackmail the others.
Holding of the referendums, as noted, was not provided for in the Guidelines. Hence, the 
Badinter’s mentioning of the Serbs was understood by them as a clear sign that they 
should make their territorial base as a precondition for their “statehood” ( before the war 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serb constituted a majority in a very few municipalities, so 
did the Croats, that is, all three communities were intermingled with each other).
Lastly, the recognition of Macedonia was initially refused althought is fulfiled the criteria 
required. It was due to Greece’s objections over the name Macedonia that implied, in 
Greece’s opinion, territorial ambitions.
Along these lines of evolution of the international community’s attitude regarding the 
recognition, there would later be the ramifications of the former Yugoslav crisis in the 
years to come.'°
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2.1 The Issue of Statehood of Former Yugoslavia, or, When Did the Dissolution 
Occur?!
One of the most important issues of the former Yugoslavia has been and still remains that 
of its international statehood. It has to do with timing, that is, with the date when former 
Yugoslavia really ceased to exist and which, in turn, has its implications on the issue of 
state continuity of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) with that of former Yugoslavia.. It 
is this issue that we shall now turn to, whereas the sate-continuity matters will be 
discussed in the next Chapter.
Regarding the issue of statehood and its implications, the co-presidents of the ICFY on 
several occasions (November 1991, July 1992, and July 1993) demanded and received 
thirteen opinions that we already mentioned. In these opinions, the Badinter Commission 
concluded that with the dissolution, which started in November 1991 and ended in July 
1992, the former SFRY ceased to exist as an international legal subject.
The process of dissolution of former Yugoslavia, from the political standpoint, has started 
much earlier as we have already seen in previous pages of the thesis. Now, we discuss 
this process from the legal point of view for it has had its implications on the issues of 
succession, especially in matters of state property, archives, debts and assets of the former 
Yugoslavia."
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The Badinter’s attitude that former Yugoslavia has ceased to exist has been 
internationally accepted, but this view has so far not been shared by the Serbs who still 
consider that there had been a case of secession on the part of the former Yugoslav 
Republics and that FRY ( Serbia and Montenegro ) continues the statehood of former 
Yugoslavia.'· The Serbian academicians also hold the same view as the state structures in 
Serbia and Montenegro (FRY).'^ Foreign academicians, all but one, agree that it has been 
a case of total dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.'“ If there would have been accepted 
the view that there was a secession and that former Yugoslavia still exists in the form of 
FRY (Serbia and Montenegro), it would have meant not only that the rules of state 
succession to the property, archives, debts and assets of the former Yugoslavia could be 
imposed by Serbia and Montenegro, but also that the destruction and the crimes 
committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croata might have gone with impunity, including 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s entire partition.'^
2.2. The Statehood of the Republics of Former Yugoslavia
The second important issue in the case of former Yugoslavia, both legally and politically, 
is that of its statehood and of the statehood of its former republics. In the Badinter’s 
opinions rendered between November 1991 - July 1993, there had been stressed, besides 
the fact that former Yugoslavia has ceased to exist as an international legal subject since 
July 1992, that, first, the FRY ( Serbia and Montenegro) cannot represent a continuity of
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former Yugoslavia and, second, that from the process of dissolution of former 
Yugoslavia, five new states have appeared, which derived from it and inherited it equally 
and if they do not agree otherwise, the date of their creation is as follows: 8th October 
1991 - for Slovenia and Croatia, 17th November - for Macedonia, 6th March - for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 27th April - for the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro). 
So, unless the interested parties agree otherwise, these are the dates on which the public 
property, assets and various rights, archives and debts, as well as the demands of former 
Yugoslavia pass on to the new successor states.
2.3. The Statehood of Kosova/o denied. Why?
As we have seen earlier, when the process of dissolution started in former Yugoslavia, 
Kosova/o distanced itself clearly from the violence Serbia was exercising against the 
others. At the same time the Kosova/o’s leadership viewed it and the whole war in the 
north of former Yugoslavia as a redefinition of the relations among the South Slavs of 
that part of the state. Consequently, the Assembly of Kosova/o after promulgating the 
Constitutional Declaration (2 July, 1990) and the Constitution of the Republic ( 7 
September 1990), undertook further steps, in cooperation with the already formed 
political parties, aimed at fulfilling political conditions for international legitimization of 
the right to self-determination of Kosova/o’s majority population. Among these 
conditions for international legitimization of Kosova/o’s right to self-determination was
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that of representatives of its independence movement.'^ Along these lines, as it was the 
case with former territorial entities in Yugoslavia (save the case of Vojvodina), there had 
been held a referendum for Kosova as an Independent and Sovereign State ( September , 
1991 ) in order to fulfilling the main criteria, that is , the representativness of the 
independence movement in Kosova/o.
Internal redefinition of the relations in former Yugoslavia and Serbia’s aggressive 
nationalism against the others in former Yugoslavia, well imposed for Kosova/o and its 
leadership the need to pursue the same way - the path for independent internationally 
recognized statehood. The Government of the Republic of Kosova/o in a letter addressed 
to the European Peace Conference on 20 December, 1991, asked for international 
recognition of Kosova/o’s statehood justifying it with Kosova/o’s fulfillment of the 
criteria provided for in the EC’s Guidelines of 16 December 1991, as well as the 
traditional criteria for international statehood (territory, population and that of possessing 
a government in control of its territory).'*
The Badinter Commission in its already mentioned first opinion had concluded that “ in 
the case of a federal - type state, which embraces communities that posses a degree of 
autonomy and moreover, participate in the exercise of political power within the 
framework of institutions common to the Federation, the existence of the state implies 
that the federal organs represent the components of the Federation and wield effective
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power.'^ As communities that possessed a degree of autonomy were considered, in the 
second paragraph, only the republics. Kosova/o was thus excluded from this, a fact 
confirmed in all opinions and decisions issued later by the Badinter Commission.
The opinions represent an answer to the quasi legal issues, if not pure political ones, for 
they sanctioned the realpolitik-type of the situation and relations, that is, the situation 
and relations that existed at the beginning of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. The 
opinions represented the first valid international confirmation that former Yugoslavia had 
started its self-destruction. Although in its opinions of January 1992, the Badinter 
Commission did not even mention the case of Kosova/o and its recognition, in scholarly 
work the non-recognition, as noted, is explained through the lack of control over its 
territory on the side of organs that declared the independence of Kosova/o. But, this is not 
all. It is the security reasons, first and foremost, that lie above and behind the non­
recognition of Kosova/o’s independent international statehood."®
Security concerns, that is, regional and wider peace and stability count very much in the 
issues of the international recognition of new states, and this is a well known fact. If there 
is a likelihood that the new state would be a stabilizing factor, than its recognition would 
pose serious problems and vice versa.^' This fact seems to have been present, if not 
decisive, all the time the Republican status for Kosova/o was denied in former 
Yugoslavia and later after its dissolution. For how it can be explained the recognition of 
Macedonia although it did not have full effective control over its own territory. The
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difference is that while in the case of FYROM, Serbia did not dare to make an open 
aggression which, in turn, helped the FYROM Government to effectively control the 
territory and thus realize its right to external self-determination, in the case of Kosova/o 
the international community was reluctant to help facilitate exercising the right to 
independent statehood of Kosova/o and its majority population. Rather, the international 
community encouraged the peaceful way of the Kosovar Albanians by treating Kosova as 
an issue of human rights and self-determination within the framework of control by 
Serbia’s govemment.^^
In fact, Kosova/o’s leadership peaceful way to achieve the effective control over its 
territory has been encouraged by most of the international community. Yet, it has turned 
into a vicious circle for all sides: Kosova/o itself, Serbia and the international community. 
While for Kosovars the independent statehood of Kosova/o is a matter of survival, for 
Serbia it is a matter of remaining in power of those structures that started the war of 
aggression in former Yugoslavia. For international community, Kosova/o is a matter of 
stability . It is obvious now, every day in and day out, that this cannot be achieved 
by enslaving Kosova/o’s majority population for that sake. At the same time, making 
pressure on Kosova/o’s peaceful leadership to accept a status short of independent 
statehood runs counter to all the values proclaimed by the same international community 
or, as one author has put it within the context of Bosnia’s tragedy, it runs counter to “ a 
fight for a principled peace”.^  ^Kosova/o’s peaceful way to independent statehood should 
and must not be neglected if there is to be peace and stability in the region.
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2.4. The Issue of Boundaries and the so-called Uti Possidetis Principle
The very nature of the wars in former Yugoslavia could be seen on the issue of borders. 
From there , it is apparent enought that they were the wars of aggression against other 
entities and nations and that they had long ago been prepared. In a Memorandum of the 
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the issue of borders takes an highly noticeable 
place and advantage to be given in future by those in power in Serbia. Also, long before 
the war started, Milosevic would openly proclaim his intentions on war issues under the 
well-known slogan “All Serbs in One State”.
Obsession for territory has as well been present in the case of former Soviet Union and 
elsewhere in the ex-socialist countries. '^* The difference with Serbia, though, lies in the 
fact that it was and still is a part of its national program for territorial and national 
expansion towards the lands that have never been Serbia’s on whatever basis, except by 
mythology. Slobodan Milosevic, an executor of the Memorandum, had warned in public 
that the disappearance of former Yugoslavia would rise the question of the future 
boundaries between the republics, while his supporters in the media already had their 
plans worked out. On 12 February 1991, Ilustrovana Politika (Belgrade based newspaper) 
published a map showing the future shape of Serbia, according to which it would have to 
incorporate the bulk of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a large part of Croatia. The opposition 
parties did agree as well.^  ^Kosova and its territory as a whole were taken for granted, i.e., 
as a territory that cannot be contested that belongs to Serbia.
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This Serbian stance would take its apparent shape in the formal question addressed to the 
Conference on Yugoslavia by the then Serbia’s Foreign Minister. In a letter dated 
October the 4th, 1991, Serbia asked the Arbitration Committee ( Commission ) of the 
Conference, among others, the following: “Can the internal borders between Croatia and 
Serbia and between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia be regarded as frontiers in terms 
of public international law”.^®
In fact this was a clear sign regarding Serbia’s future targets and its policy of “ethnic 
cleansing’’ since the redrawing of borders could not be achieved peacefully, especially in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina due to its ethnic mixture.^’ On the other side, the international 
community fairly early, by the end of August 1991, would give its first message that the 
so-called uti possidetis principle (have what you have had) will be applied in the 
Yugoslav case as well. Thus, on August 27, 1991 the European Community and its 
member states expressed dismay at the increasing violence in Croatia, reminding “ those 
responsible for violence” that the EU was determined “never to recognize changes of 
frontiers which have not been brought about by peaceful means and agreement”. The use 
of force by Serbia’s irregulars and the Yugoslav People’s Army was declared as illegal.·28
This stance was echoed latter by the then CSCE (now OSCE), the UN, and most of 
individual states, and had been internationally once again confirmed in Opinion No.3 of 
the Badinter’s Commission which stated th a t: “... In the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary, the former boundaries acquire the character of borders protected by international
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law. Such is the conclusion derived from the principle of respect for the territorial status 
quo and particularly that of uti possidetis which, although initially recognized in the 
settlement of problems of decolonization in America and Africa, constitutes today a 
principle of general application as declared by the International Court of Justice”.T h is  
ruling has been arrived at despite a memorandum submitted by the “rump” federal 
presidency. The presidency denied the applicability of uti possidetis to internal 
boundaries since, it asserted, they had been brawn up to meet policy considerations after 
World War II, at the instigation of the Communist Party and without regard to ethnic 
considerations.^”
Looking at the background as to how the principle had been applied, it is easy to discern 
two issues. First is that the main reason for its applicability has always been to preserve 
peace and stability in the region, that is, to ensure that borders would not be a bone of 
contention between the newly established states, notwithstanding their real history and 
whether they were redrawn in a just and right manner.^' Badinter as well pursued this 
line of reasoning stressing that uti possidetis principle’s “obvious purpose is to prevent 
the independence and stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal struggles”.^ ^
Second, the way it was applied in the past, as mentioned by Badinter himself, dealt 
mainly with border lands and populations not of large portions and numbers respectively. 
In the case of former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, though, it was interpreted as a 
principle comprising large parts of territories and population, like it was the case with
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Kosova/o. This way of application leaves the people on “the wrong side of the border” 
ripe for “ethnic cleansing”.”  Consequently, this way prevents in advance any discussion 
over the border adjustments and equalizes the cases where the territorial base is created 
by the use of force and ethnically cleansing the others with those where the territorial 
bases existed since the time immemorial (the case of Kosova/o and that of “Republika 
Srpska”).”
The first serious attempt to correct this stance was done at the European level when 
“Pacte sur la Stabilité en Europe had been drafted ” in August 1993. It fell in deaf ears 
though.”
2.5. The right to self-determination within the context of former Yugoslavia and the 
subjects entitled to that right: Republics or Peoples?
Historically, the principle of uti possidetis meant that it should cover all the territories 
conquered by force, notwithstanding the will of the population. The principle of self- 
determination, that is, the “expression of the will of a people” had no role to play.”  After 
the Second World War, though, this situation changed so that the principle of self- 
determination served to rectify uti possidetis principle in its previous form : expression of 
the will of a population had to be taken into account while drawing the borders. The 
decolonization process is a good proof of this state of affairs. Yet it was never recognized,
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until 1993, that the application could be based only upon the ethnic composition of a 
given territory: self-determination remained for a long time after the War as territorially 
based. This situation, from the formal (legal) standpoint of international law, changed in 
1993 when it had been adopted the Vienna Declaration that recognizes the ethnic self- 
determination.^’
Serbian mind-set, at the beginning of the crisis, was “ethnically based” when it came to 
those territories where the Serbs were in majority, though dispersed and with no territorial 
base, and “territorially” when it came to those parts they controlled effectively (the case 
of Kosova/o), notwithstanding the ethnic composition. In line with this, Serbia 
formulated the second part of the question quoted above . Namely, Serbia’s Foreign 
Minister asked the Badinter Commission whether “the Serbian populations in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were entitled to benefit from the right to self determination”.’* The 
Commission had already addressed the problem of self-determination in the abstract 
when rendering its second opinion. The Commission drew a distinction between 
minorities and entities established as territorially defined administrative units of a federal 
nature, whose population was entitled to exercise the right to self-determination if certain 
procedures were followed, including the holding of a fair and internationally supervised 
referendum in which all groups could participate on an equal footing. Uti possidetis, in 
this sense, was adopted as a means to prevent a total unraveling of the existing structure 
of government and territorial definition. The Commission tempered the consequences for
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a minority suddenly finding itself within a new state by ascribing a second level of 
content to the right to self-determination. It confirmed that all members of minorities 
were entitled to benefit from minority and human rights established in international 
community. In conclusion, the commission affirmed, first, “that the Serbian populations 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia have the right to benefit from all the rights 
recognized as belonging to minorities and ethnic groups by international law and by the 
provisions of the draft Convention of the Conference on Peace in Yugoslavia”; and, 
second, “that the republics ought to grant to the members of these minorities and ethnic 
groups the totality of human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by international 
law, including, as the case may by, the right to choose their nationality.^’
This sort of self-determination granted to the Serbian people, that is, the right to internal 
self-determination was much obvious in the Commission’s view regarding Bosnia- 
Herzegovina’s application for international recognition of its statehood.. The Commission 
also based itself on the human right of minorities and ethnic groups to equal participation 
in government. Since no referendum on independence had taken place that would have 
given a voice to these minorities and groups, the commission found that the popular will 
for independent statehood had not been “clearly established”.'*“ The Commission 
indicated, however, that this conclusion could be changed if an internationally supervised 
referendum, open to all citizens without discrimination, were held.
A referendum under international supervision, as noted earlier, was not required by the
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EC’s Guidelines. Yet, Bosnia-Herzegovina held a referendum on March 1, 1992, 
although many Serbs boycotted the poll, almost 63 percent of the electorate opted for 
independence. The problem is that Serbs, with their national program in mind, had 
already made their own “declaration on independence” on January 9,1992. All they were 
waiting was the appropriate time to start forceful creation of the territorial base which 
they lacked. This started in full, at the behest of Belgrade, after Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
internationally recognized. Despite all the tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the heavy 
prize paid for its statehood, the Dayton Peace Accords, although recognized the 
“Republika Srpska” as one of the entities, they certainly denied the international 
recognition of its legitimacy. This has been and is a right step in a right direction due to 
the way the “Republika Srpska” was created.
2.6. Was and is it Kosova/o Entitled to Self-Determination According to the Rules of 
International Law?
Kosova/o has been and remains as one of the key elements of the former Yugoslav crisis. 
Yet, the right to self-determination, that is, the independent statehood of Kosova/o was 
denied due to the reasons already mentioned. Answer to the above question, thought, 
means that we should once again repeat in brief the basis for self-determination of the 
entities of former Yugoslavia.
Although in former Yugoslavia’s scholarly work there have been and are still illusions
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that the basis for self- determination of former republics was the 1974 Constitution, it is 
sure that the Constitution did not contain any provision regarding the right to self- 
determination up to secession, as this was understood in all former Communist 
countries '*' An exception to this were the provisions of that constitution contained in its 
preambular part. This fact has rightly been labeled as a “ reincarnation ” of the right to 
self-determination for it was considered as valid only outside the former Yugoslavia and 
in its relations with foreign countries and peoples, while for the internal purposes it was 
considered as consumed by the mere fact of the creation of former Yugoslavia.'*"
This brief overview shows that self-determination has been put in life outside the context 
of the 1974 Constitution, and mainly as a result of the action of centrifugal forces. This 
fact was also confirmed in Badinter’s opinion No. 1 of November 1991, in which the 
Commission stated that:
“.... The form of internal political organization and the constitutional provisions are mere 
facts, although it is necessary to take them into consideration in order to determine the 
Government’s sway over the population and the territory”.
The last part of this sentence reveals also that the Constitution of 1974 served as a means 
to differentiate and facilitate those entities entitled to self-determination, and, at the same 
time, give a clear sign to all parties that there will not be allowed the use of force by any
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“government” or “community” with a view of creating a new territorial base, the sign 
that was misunderstood by the Serbs in hope that the international community would 
legalize and legitimize internationally their military gains. In sum, the Constitution of 
1974 served only for the purpose of facilitating the process of self-determination and as a 
reference point to discern the time the break-up of former Yugoslavia occurred, an event 
that followed as a result of the action of centrifugal forces of the time.
On the other side, the break-up of that state, from the standpoint of international law, was 
internationally legitimized due to the existence of the principle of self-determination 
(“expression of the free will”) and the very repressive nature of that state, as it was the 
case with all former Communist countries'*  ^ In other words, former Yugoslavia lost its 
international legitimacy owing to the regime’s repressive nature, which, in urn, activated 
the centrifugal forces within it. As it can be seen from this, the mere facts, that is, the 
realpolitik has been a key reference in determining the initial subjects of self- 
determination within former Yugoslavia.
Although international law has a “neutral” stance on the issues of statehood, it 
nevertheless posses some limits as to the ways for achieving the external self- 
determination (independent statehood). This means that international law prohibits the 
use of force or threat thereof aiming at achieving a new territorial base to the detriment 
of a given community, especially if the force has as a result the commission of a crimes 
against humanity.'*'*
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Kosova/o, as one of the territorial entities of former Yugoslavia has its population and 
territory in which the majority has always been Albanian (over 90 percent). State 
structures that organized the independence referendum, though, lacked and still are 
lacking the effective control over Kosova/o and its population. Ever since the former 
Yugoslavia destroyed itself, Kosova/o did not play any part in terms of the above said 
centrifugal forces. It has been treated as a matter of human rights violation and a crisis 
that endangers the stability in the region."  ^This fact, that is, continuous human rights 
violations, according to some authors could well be a basis for Kosova/o’s right to self- 
determination, meaning full independence.“**
There are scholars that, not rarely, equalize Kosova/o’s right to self-determination with 
that of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia ( “the Republika Srpska” and former 
“Krajinas” in Croatia that were destroyed by the Croat forces in 1995). In both cases, 
there caimot be any similarity with Kosova/o for the following reasons: First, the gross 
violation of human rights was a basis for self-determination on the eve of former 
Yugoslavia’s break-up and during this process. Second, after its dissolution Serbs used 
the common military and police force to achieve their national goals by ethnically 
cleansing or occupying other territories and peoples, i.e., parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia and Kosova/o. The fact that former Yugoslavia ceased to exist and that Kosova/o 
as well has been one of the elements of the crisis having its population and with clear 
territorial base, should be serving as a basis for self-determination of Kosova/o and its
majority population.
-60-
Unfortunately, the individual recognition of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) after the 
Dayton peace Accords established a very bad precedent by legalizing to a certain extent 
the use of force and ethnic cleansing as a means for achieving political goals. Since then, 
the Kosova/o people and its leadership has showed a signs of serious disillusionment 
regarding their peaceful way as a means to achieving the independent statehood.“*’ The 
“outer wall of sanctions” remains the only hope that the international community would 
not stay idly regarding the use of force as a means of achieving the right to self- 
determination. On this issue we shall turn in the following chapter.
3. Failure of the London Conference and the Kosova/o issue
Among the Conference’s six Working Groups, there had been established the Working 
Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities in order to recommending the 
initiatives for resolving ethnic questions in former Yugoslavia. A Special Group on 
Kosova/o, as a former autonomous province, was set up.“** This Special Kosova/o 
Working Group was chaired by Ambassador G. Ahrens.
During the Conference, setting up of the Kosova/o Special Working Group had been 
fervently opposed by Milosevic on the basis that this was a Serbian internal matter. He 
has afterwards been and still is hostile to any hint at internationalization of the issue. He 
has never gone so far as to deny the ICFY’s right to be involved in Kosova/o, but he was
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distinctly unenthusiastic about any initiative Among the Kosovar Albanians there is a 
strong belief that if it was not for the than Prime Minister of the FRY ( Serbia & 
Montenegro ), Milan Panic, who had been chosen by the Serbs in order to mitigate the 
consequences of the bad image resulting from Serbia’s aggression against Bosnia - 
Herzegovina and Croatia, in the London Conference would have been a quite separate 
Working Group on Kosova/o and not as it was done, that is, as a sub-group. These 
feelings were shared with the author of these thesis by the Kosovar Albanians who 
participated in the Conference, headed by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova himself
Anyway, Kosova/o Working Group met on several occasions with the Serbian authorities 
and the Kosovar Albanian leadership. In fact, it met on six occasions between 30 
September and early December 1992 during a time when Prime Minister Panic and some 
others in the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) Government were ready to consider serious 
arrangements for Kososva/o’s autonomy. But, the Kosovar Albanian leadership never 
accepted such an solution for Kosova/o based on a fact that Kosova/o has its right to self- 
determination like the others in former Yugoslavia.^®
In 1993, the CSCE Mission in Prishtina was ordered out by Milosevic and the Working 
Group’s aetivities came to a virtual standstill: The Kosova/o issue, though, from this time 
onwards was raised by the ICFY’s co-chairmen directly with Milosevic, but his promises 
of progress were never fulfilled^'
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The events in Bosnia-Herzegovina overshadowed Kosova/o issue and the setting up of 
the Contact Group (1994) marked the formal collapse of the Conference altogether. Later, 
though, after the Paris Peace Agreements were signed in line with the Dayton Accords, it 
was decided that from the ICFY’s Working Groups survive only that regarding the 
Succession Issues and the Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and 
Minorities.“ Formally, Kosova/o issue ever since remained aside of any international 
attention, if not equalized with the Albanians in Western part of the FYROM. Yet, the 
political activities over Kosova/o on international plane have been and still are highly 
immense due to its potential destabilizing force in the region.“
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CHAPTER IV: THE PEACE PROCESS IN FULL SWING AND THE 
KOSOVA/O ISSUE
1. Dayton Peace Accords and the Kosova/o Issue
It is certain that the Dayton Peace Accords represent the biggest ever success of 
international diplomacy headed by the United States after the end of Cold War. It finally 
ended three and a half years long war of aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina and destroyed 
the idea of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia. Apart from this it showed that Euro- 
Atlantic coordination, that is, its lack during the time the war lasted was a main cause of 
the Bosniac tragedy and the West’s failure, especially as far as Europe is concerned. 
Above all, the events following the signing of the Dayton Accords proved invariably the 
falsity of the myth on the Serbian invincibility, or, to put it another way, it proved that it 
had been a mere lie, if not the product of European decision-making centers to cover up 
their reluctance to get heavily involved in the conflict. In the aftermath of the Dayton 
Accords, they represented the most criticized endeavor in the scholarly work. The first 
papers written in the months following the signature bear witness to this.'
International community’s primary interest in the region continues to be preventing any 
outbreaks of violence. Some Western actions have been influential in this, in particular 
the US President George Bush’s 1992 “ Christmas warning ” to Belgrade that the United
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States would not tolerate ethnic cleansing in Kosova/o. That warning has been repeated 
by his successor, Bill Clinton, and underscored by a symbolic US military presence 
in Macedonia, since 1993.^
The Kosovar Albanians exclusion from the peace process, that culminated with the 
signing of the Dayton Agreements, left them with the feeling that they were being 
punished for their strategy of non-violence, or, at least, taken for granted, while those 
who started the wars in the former Yugoslavia are commanding respect and being 
rewarded. And developments since the Dayton was signed - the apparent difficulties, if 
not the failure, of the agreement to reverse the ethnic division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the international community’s apparent willingness to accept that result, and the speed 
with which Western European countries have moved to upgrade ties with the FRY 
(Serbia and Montenegro) - have only strengthened such feelings.^ The hopes raised by the 
so-called “outer wall of sanctions” were soon dashed among the Kosovar Albanians as 
Western European states moved at the beginning of 1996 to recognize Belgrade, starting 
with France in February and followed by Britain, Austria, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy, and Finland. The European Union nonetheless 
proved once again its complete lack of common foreign policy by being unable to make a 
move as a whole.
With this Kosovar Albanians’ common perception in mind, after the Dayton there are 
three approaches to the problem that are being considered by them:
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a) . There are those who realize that the clue to solving the problem remains in 
Belgrade, and that negotiations to that end are inevitable and necessary;
b) . The view that they have nothing to except from the international community is also 
gaining ground on the more radical side, which speaks of independence through the 
armed struggle;
c) . The view of the shadow President of the Republic of Kosova/o, Dr.lbrahim Rugova, 
who maintains his non-violent strategy of passive resistance by appealing to the world 
community for independence on the basis of Albanian victimization/
To the first group belong mainly some non-influential individuals among the Kosovar 
Albanians. The basic competition is between the second and the last streams within the 
Kosovar Albanians independence movement. After February 1996, the second group has 
been gaining in weight. Since then the clandestine Kosova Liberation Army (U^K) 
entered the political scene bombing homes in which Krajina Serb refugees from Croatia 
were settled. The group also claimed responsibility for shooting deaths of five Serbs (one 
a policeman) in response to the 21 April 1996 killing of an Albanian student in Prishtina 
(the capital of Kosova/o) by a Serbian civilian, as well as for many acts of violence that 
have been occurring in Kosova/o ever since..
These outbreaks of violence by the Kosovar Albanians, that are still going on after seven 
years of nonviolent resistance and that were deemed as very serious in the US 
Department Statement after Ibrahim Rugova’s visit to the US in August 1996, show that
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some groups are setting their own strategy for breaking the deadlock between Kosovar 
leaders and the Serbian government. The United States warned Ibrahim Rugova’s 
Democratic Party of Kosova that it should distance itself from the violent actions of the 
“Liberation Army of Kosova”, which is the sign that the Kosova/o issue is entering a 
new, more dangerous, phase.^
2. The So-called Outer Wall of Sanctions and the Kosova/o Issue
In the USIA Wireless File of November 23,1995, released by the State Department, there 
had been given a “Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement”.*' This was the first time 
that the concept of the “out^r wall of sanctions” had been made public in a written form.
In the above paper, it is written that : “ A resolution will be introduced in the UN 
Security Council to lift the arms embargo against all of the states of the former 
Yugoslavia. Trade sanctions against Serbia will be suspended, but may be reimposed if 
Serbia or any other Serb authorities fail significantly to meet their obligations under the 
peace agreement. An “outer wall” of sanctions will remain in place until Serbia addresses 
a number of other areas of concern, including Kosovo and cooperation with the War 
Crimes Tribunal...”.
The UN Security Council, accordingly, first suspended and later lifted totally trade 
sanctions against the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) with its resolutions Nos. 1022 of 22
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The content of the “outer wall” of sanctions” affect first and foremost the membership in 
international organizations and bodies and the access to international financial institutions 
- a key source of assistance for reconstruction and that primary the International 
Monetary Found (IMF) and World Bank (WB). Although the issue of membership in 
international organizations and bodies and that of access to international financial 
organizations of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) has been reformulated in political 
terms as the “outer wall of sanctions”, its basic origins lie on the legal documents 
rendered at the time the former Yugoslav crisis began, starting from the Badinter 
Commission’s opinions and the others after it. The conditions, though, to be fulfilled by 
the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) with a view to getting the membership and access in 
the above-mentioned international structures are of a pure political nature and have been 
serving as a means to force Serbia-Montenegro to comply with the standards of 
international behavior.
November 1995 and 1047 of 1 October 1996 respectively.’
In the following lines we shall discuss the international-legal and political documents that 
represent the foundations of the concept “outer wall” of sanctions, that is, opinions No. 8, 
10 and 11 of the Badinter’s Commission; the UN Security Resolution No. 777 (1992); 
and, finally, the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 47/1 (1992). Based on these 
documents, the IMF and WB respectively have passed the appropriate documents, which
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altogether represent the encircelement of the political and legal basis of the international 
concept: “outer wall” of sanctions.
On 18 May 1992 the Arbitration Commission was asked by the then Chairman of the 
Conference on Yugoslavia as to whether the process of dissolution, as outlined in the 
already discussed opinion No.l., could be regarded as completed. It was noted, as we 
discussed earlier, that a referendum held in Bosnia-Herzegovina during February and 
March 1992 had produced a majority in favor of independence and that Serbia and 
Montenegro established “ a new state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, adopting a 
new constitution on 27 April 1992. It was further emphasized that the territory and 
population of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) were under 
the sovereign authority of the new States and that the common federal bodies of the 
SFRY no longer functioned. In addition, the Commission noted that Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia and Slovenia had been recognized not only by each other but also by all member 
States of the European Community (EC/EU) and other individual States and that were 
admitted to the membership of the United Nations on 22 May 1992. The Commission 
also took account of the Security Council resolution No.757 of 30 May 1992 which 
referred, for the first time, to the “former SFR Yugoslavia” and emphasized that “the 
claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue 
automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 
the United Nations has not been generally accepted ” . At the end, the Arbitration
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Commission (Committee) then concluded that “the process of dissolution of the SFR of 
Yugoslavia referred to in Opinion No.l of 29 November 1991 is now complete and that 
the SFR of Yugoslavia no longer exists.*
On 4 July 1992, the Commission produced Opinion No. 10 in which it responded 
directly to the question posed by Lord Carrington, the Chairman of the Conference on 
Yugoslavia, as to whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
was “ a new state calling for recognition”. It was noted that the FRY (Serbia and 
Montenegro) constituted a new State and not the sole successor to the SFR of Yugoslavia 
which meant that FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) “does not ipso facto enjoy the 
recognition enjoyed by the SFR of Yugoslavia under completely different circumstances. 
It is therefore for other states, where appropriate, to recognize the new State”. Such 
recognition by member States of the European Community would be subject to its 
compliance with the conditions laid down by general international law and by the Joint 
Statement and the Guidelines of 16 December 1991, ended the Commission (Committee).
On 19 September 1992, the Security Council of the UN adopted a resolution No.777 
(1992) in which it was noted that “the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist” and that “the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations”. It, therefore, 
recommended to the General Assembly that it decided that the Federal Republic of
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Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations, 
and that it should not participate in the work of the General Assembly. Having received 
that recommendation, the General Assembly adopted resolution 47/1 in which it noted 
that “the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ( Serbia and Montenegro ) cannot continue 
automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in the United Nations” and “therefore decides that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations 
and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly
Finally, on 15 December 1992, the International Monetary Fund announced that it “found 
that Yugoslavia has ceased to exist and has therefore ceased to be a member of the 
IMF”, 10 while on 25 February 1993 the executive directors of the World Bank made a 
determination that Yugoslavia had ceased to exist." The latter decisions were a logical 
consequence of the previous ones, that is, the consequence of the fact that non-member 
States of the UN cannot enjoy the membership in the IMF and the World Bank
The documents taken altogether have had a direct implications for the FRY’s (Serbia and 
Montenegro) membership in other international organizations and bodies, like is the case 
with its membership in the OSCE.'^ State practice as well has not supported at all the 
claim by FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) that it should be the continuation of the SFR of 
Yugoslavia (former Yugoslavia).The claim has also been rejected fervently by other 
successor States to the former Yugoslavia, that is, by former Yugoslav republics, now
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independent and sovereign States. 13
The “outer wall of sanctions”, that is, the membership in international organizations and 
the financial and other assistance from the IMF and World Bank on behalf of the FRY 
(Serbia and Montenegro), translated in concrete terms means that is should fulfill the 
same conditions as did the other successor States to the former Yugoslavia, as laid down 
in the EC’s (EU’s) Guidelines of 16 December 1991. In the context of Kosova/o issue, it 
is usually argued that the “outer wall of sanctions” is to be lifted if there were a 
“substantial progress for the solution of the question of Kosvoa/o”. The point under 
discussion comprises the following issues:
- immediate permission of the OSCE Monitoring Mission to return to Kosova/o;
- establishment of all democratic institutions in Kosova/o;
- putting an end with concrete effect to ferocious repression all over the country;
- starting concrete negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina for the solution of the 
political status of Kosova/o.
Regarding the latter, there have so far been even concrete proposals, especially intensified 
during the 1996 EU’s activities, in which it was said that the “ granting of a wider 
autonomy for Kosova/o within FRY (Serbia and Montenegro)” may be a right step in a 
right direction. The recent EU Council of Ministers meeting, held on 16 September 1997, 
though, does not contains such an proposal, so does not the US last year statement 
following Rugova’s visit in Washington.'''
-72-
It should be noted that the only real impact of the “outer wall of sanctions” has so far 
been the signing up of the “ Education Agreement ” by Milosevic and Rugova on 1 
September 1996. Yet its implementation has as yet been obstructed by the 
Serbian side. The next impact of the “outer wall of sanctions” has been the starting of 
some sort of informal dialogue in March and June of 1996 between the Albanian 
political parties and the Serbian opposition, held in New York (USA) and Ul?in 
(Montenegro) respectively '^  In these, say dialogues, there had been reached a wide 
consensus only as far as the way for solving the Kosova/o issue is concerned, that is, the 
peaceful way through continuous negotiations. But, since they were boycotted by the 
ruling Socialist Party of Serbia, there could not be achieved any tangible result and any 
progress whatsoever.
3. Reintegration or Integration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro)
Apart from international organizations and other bodies within the UN system, most 
notably the IMF and the World Bank, the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) has also been 
excluded from the other regional organizations and initiatives, one of the most important 
being the OSCE.
There are no general legal rules on state succession in respect of membership in
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international organizations. The rules concerning acquisition of membership laid down in 
the statutes and other relevant rules of each organization are paramount.'* Based on this 
and on the above-mentioned resolutions of the UN Security Council and of General 
Assembly, most of the international organizations and other bodies within the UN system 
denied the FRY’s (Serbia and Montenegro) claim for continuity of the former 
Yugoslavia’s membership in these structures”
Since the continuity of membership in international organizations is heavily dependent 
on the internal rules (statutes) of these organizations, the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) 
had all the time insisted on its continuity with former Yugoslavia regarding the latter’s 
membership in the international organizations. This situation caused a considerable 
confusion within the UN system. The fact was further complicated on 29 September 1992 
after the Legal Council of the UN delivered an open legal opinion setting out the UN 
Secretariat’s interpretation of the impact of the UN General Assembly Rez. No.47/1 of 22 
September 1992, the latter being already discussed by us. This legal opinion of the Legal 
Council was in favor of the FRY’s (Serbia and Montenegro) stance that it could continue 
the former Yugoslavia’s membership in the UN and its bodies, that is, that there should 
be only reintegration of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) and that there is no sense 
speaking of its first time-type of integration into these organisms and bodies.
In view of this situation, the UN General Assembly adopted a further resolution No.48/88 
on 29 December 1992, operative paragraph 19 of which "... reaffirms its resolution 47/1
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of 22 December 1992, and urges Member States and the UN Secretariat in fulfilling the 
spirit of that resolution, to end the de facto working status of Serbia and Montenegro”.'® 
This situation lasted well until after the Dayton Agreement was reached (1995). Since 
then, there have started a process of a reintegration of the FRY ( Serbia and Montenegro 
) in all specialized agencies and other bodies within the UN system, save the General 
Assembly, IMF and the World Bank. This practice has also been followed on the regional 
plane, save the case of the OSCE to which FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply 
for a new membership, that is, for its first time integration instead of the reintegration. 
This practice can be explained with the political nature of the issue of membership in the 
UN, IMF, World Bank and the OSCE, that is, that FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) as one 
of the successor States to the former Yugoslavia must fulfill the same criteria for the 
admission in these structures as did the other new States emerged from the former 
Yugoslavia, and not merely be reintegrated within them. Now we shall discuss the highly 
controversial issue of the OSCE’s membership of FRY (Serbia and Montenegro), for it is 
in this body that there could be clearly seen a tendency for the reintegration rather than 
integration under the disguise that if RFY had from the outset been its full member, there 
would have been a more cooperativity regarding all issues, including the permission to 
work of the OSCE Monitoring Mission for Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. Or, to put it 
another way, the representatives of FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) have for a long time 
been claiming that there cannot be a cooperation with a country suspended from the right 
to participate in the work of a body that deals with its internal affairs, hence RFY’s
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(Serbia and Montenegro) membership should be renewed.
In fact, there is some truth in this stance due to the very nature of the OSCE and the 
history of former Yugoslavia’s suspension (exclusion) from its work in 1992. At this 
point it is difficult to say whether FRY ( Serbia and Montenegro ) will return to the 
OSCE or apply fro a new membership. In the first case, it would imply recognition of its 
continuity under international law with that of former Yugoslavia, while in the second it 
would be considered as an admission of a new member - a stance advocated by the whole 
international community and other former Yugoslavia’s republics. The second solution 
finds its support only in the fact that the OSCE is based on political commitments of 
member states rather than on a traditional international agreement, like is the case with 
the UN, as well as in the fact that professional and diplomatic circles explain the absence 
of FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) from the OSCE as a suspension. It should be noted, 
though, that this runs counter to the very idea of the “suspension formulae’’ as it was 
applied in the case of former Yugoslavia.
The decision to prevent the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) from participating at the 
CSCE (OSCE) meetings was passed by the Committee of Senior Officials on 8 July 
1992, referring to the assessments in the declaration of this body of 12 and 20 May of the 
same year. In these declarations “the Belgrade authorities and YPA (Yugoslav People’s 
Army)” had been charged of “aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina”. The decision on 
suspension was made for a period of three months and its withdrawal was made
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conditional on the respect of main CSCE (OSCE) principles and cooperation with the 
Permanent Mission for Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, whose establishment was 
indicated at that point. The CSCE (OSCE) took the stand that in deciding on the future 
position of Yugoslavia it would take into consideration the discussion about the status of 
FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) in the UN and on official stand of the EC Arbitration 
Commission (Badinter Commission).'^
The balance of power within the OSCE, continuation of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
FRY’s (Serbia and Montenegro) heavily involvement on it, unsettled status of FRY 
(Serbia and Montenegro) in the UN, that is, the non-acceptance of its State-continuity 
with that of former Yugoslavia caused the automatic continuation of suspension although 
a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the OSCE and the FRY (Serbia 
and Montenegro) Government on 28 October 1992, which regulated the operation of the 
Permanent CSCE (OSCE) Mission for Kosova, Sandjak and Vojvodina. The mandate of 
that mission was extended once again, but since the suspension had not been lifted, FRY 
(Serbia and Montenegro) Government declined further hospitality to the Mission on 28 
June 1993.
The meeting of the CSCE Council, held in Stockholm in December 1992, repeated that 
leaders of Serbia and Montenegro and Serbian forces active in Bosnia-Herzegovina bear 
the greatest responsibility for the conflict in the territory of former Yugoslavia. Ministers 
of the OSCE participating States informed the Yugoslav leaders that only “radical
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changes of their policy toward the neighbors and their own people and real cooperation in 
the peace process will gradually return the country into international community”.·“ The 
next OSCE meeting (Rome, December 1993) advocated “urgent and unconditional” 
return of the Permanent Mission for Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, as well as resuming 
of negotiations about the future status of Kosovo. Ministers reiterated that the decisive 
condition for participation of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) in the CSCE work is 
acceptance of its “principles, obligations and decisions”.^ ' The Budapest Summit a year 
later, in which participated along side with Albanian delegation the author of these lines, 
failed to reach consensus over the issue referring to the former Yugoslav crisis due to the 
confronting views of the Russian Federation and Western countries
Signing of the Dayton Agreements (1995) and lifting of the UN sanctions against RFY 
(Serbia and Montenegro) in early October 1996 opened the way for its 
integration/reintegration to the OSCE. During 1996 began diplomatic contacts within 
which the delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE Chairman 
visited Belgrade, while in December of that year the OSCE was invited to send a mission 
that would investigate the facts relating to the local elections in Serbia.
Despite all these raproachments in FRY’s (Serbia and Montenegro) relations with the 
OSCE, it seems unlikely that there would be any sort of reintegration of the FRY (Serbia 
and Montenegro) in the OSCE notwithstanding the latter’s political nature. The 
reintegration of the FRY ( Serbia and Montenegro) ,  rather than its integration as a new
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member, would mean accepting as a full member a State which is not as yet the UN’s 
member. The FRY’s (Serbia and Montenegro) membership in the UN is and should be a 
precondition for the membership in the OSCE and other European and Euro-Atlantic 
structures, such as the Council of Europe, the European Union, NATO or its program 
Partnership for Peace. There is not and should not be any reason for non-applying the 
same criteria and pursuing the same path as it was done in with other former Yugoslav 
republics. In the contrary, it would be additional argument to the view that only arms and 
aggressors count in today’s international community.
4. New Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) : Continuity or Break with Former 
SFR of Yugoslavia ?!
From the time former Yugoslavia was created and internationally recognized after the 
First World War, up to its dissolution after the end of Cold War, the main issue had been 
that of its State continuity with the Kingdom of Serbia, the view fervently supported by 
Serbs. The reason behind this has been and still is Serbia’s intention to keep the 
international legal title to rule the others under the disguise of “Yugoslavia”, especially 
Albanian inhabited lands it occupied and annexed after the Balkan Wars (1912-13). This 
hegemony mind-set of Serbia could be clearly seen in the reasoning of the then Prime 
Minister of Serbia, Nikola Pasic.
In fact, Pasic denied the understanding of many of Serbia’s wartime allies that victory
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had created a new state, “Yugoslavia”. Belgrade preferred to see the “Serb-Croat-Slovene 
Kingdom” as merely a natural extension of the Kingdom of Serbia, requiring no new 
foundation in international law of the time. This theory of “continuity” between Serbia 
and Yugoslavia was to bedevil the Kingdom, since it raised and settled the acute issue of 
whether the non-Serbs were to be treated as equals with the Serbs or just as “little 
brothers” (In 1917, Pasic had told the non-Serb proponents of “Yugoslavia” that the King 
would always have to be Orthodox by religion). In the case of Kosova/o and Macedonia, 
though, Pasic argued that they were integrated into the Kingdom before 1914 and 
therefore cannot be affected by the Paris Settlement on minority rights, based exactly on 
the same Serbian “continuity” logic^^
We refer here to as “Yugoslavia” in terms of international law, for in this respect it is 
irrelevant the form of its internal organization, that is, whether it was a kingdom or a 
socialist federation until it destroyed itself in 1991-92. '^' This clarification was needed 
since the Serbian logic of “continuity” has been present all the time the former 
Yugoslavia existed, and it is still the same situation, although there is an excellent 
doctoral dissertation written by a Serb, Dr. Stevan Djordjevic, entitled “O kontinuitetu 
drzava s posebnim osvrtom na medjunarodno-pravni kontinuitet Kraljenvine Jugoslavie i 
Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (Beograd, 1967).^  ^ In this dissertation, the author has 
conclusively argued in favor of State continuity of the pre-War Yugoslavia with that of 
post-War, on the one side, and of the State discontinuity of the Kingdom of Serbia with 
that of former Yugoslavia ( be it a kingdom or the Socialist Federation after the Second
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World War).
The logic of “continuity”, as noted, has been pursued by Serbia well after the former 
Yugoslavia’s dissolution (1991-92).^ *  ^ This conclusion can be derived from the present 
behavior of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) on internal and international stage, or 
from the recent years’ scholarly work published in Serbia itself.^’ The international 
community, as we have seen so far in this thesis, has not accepted such an reasoning of 
Serbia. In this is included a firm rejection by former Yugoslavia’s republics as well. The 
foreign scholarly work is not any different, save the one author who has supported 
Serbia’s reasoning on “ State continuity”.^ *
If the international community had accepted Serbia’s stance on “State continuity”, it 
would have had a large-scale negative political implications. It would have meant that the 
others were the secessionists so that FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) would have had a 
legitimate right to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of former 
Yugoslavia; Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia would have been considered as 
protectors of that legitimate right and Serbia not as an aggressor State; the rights and 
duties of the former Yugoslavia would have been redefined according to Serbia’s 
vagaries; etc. In sum, in that case Serbia would have controlled the complete application 
of the others right to self-determination with all its implications, the rights and duties the 
practical implementation involves by itself, something similar she has been doing in the 
case of Kosova/o.
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5. Importance and the Effects According to International Law of the so-called the 
“Agreements on Normalization of Relations” or of the Other Similar Documents 
Concluded Between the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) and Macedonia, Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively (April-October 1996)
In the first article of the Framework of the Agreement on Peace in Bosnia signed in Paris 
on 14 December 1995, it has been foreseen that The Partners shall particularly respect 
in full the sovereign equality of each of them, settle conflicts peacefully and refrain from 
any act, either by way of threat, use of force or in any other way, against territorial 
integrity and political independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and other State."'  ^ In the last 
article of the document, the RFY ( Serbia and Montenegro ) and Bosnia - 
Herzegovina recognized each other mutually as independent sovereign states within 
their international borders.
Above paragraphs, taken together with the Dayton Agreements, are in full line with the 
stance of international community regarding the subjects within the former Yugoslavia 
entitled to international sovereign statehood, the issue we already discussed in previous 
chapters. But, the contentious issue has until recently been that of Serbia’s insistence that 
it is the only successor to the former Yugoslavia, while the others are the secessionists. 
This logic of reasoning in FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) is based on the example of the 
Russian Federation and its continuity with former Soviet Union, quite a different 
example both in its formal and real (substantial) terms.^°
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After loosing the wars in Bosnia and Croatia and the signing of the Dayton Accords, 
Serbia hoped that it could achieve post festum a sort of “Alma Atta” agreements with the 
others, although the signing of the Dayton Accords was a clear sign that there will be no 
State continuity with former Yugoslavia on behalf of any of former republics. The 
Dayton Peace Accords’ stipulation that there should be a formal mutual recognition 
between former Yugoslavia’s republics, a stance as well endorsed by the EU’s Ministerial 
meeting held in February of 1996, mirrored Serbia’s desire and intention to lobby in order 
to attract some support in favor of its State-continuity with former Yugoslavia. To this 
effect, she concluded two agreements, with Macedonia and Croatia respectively, and 
issued one Joint Statement with Bosnia-Herzegovina.^'
In these documents, there are two important issues that clearly speak about Serbia’s 
intentions to achieve some support in favor of it state continuity with former 
Yugoslavia, with all the consequences such an act could have for the others, a matter 
discussed earlier. The first issue regards the naming itself of the documents, that is, the 
“Agreements on Normalization of Relations”, concluded between FRY (Serbia and 
Montenegro) and Macedonia and Croatia respectively. The headings of these documents 
leave an impression as if there had only been a sort of derail in relations between the 
respective States and the signing of the documents was meant to put them on track again, 
which is not the case. The opposite is true instead. Rather, they represent the documents 
which established the diplomatic relations, for the first time in their respective history, 
after a long wars ignited and conducted by Serbia and Montenegro and made possible
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only after a defeat of the plans of Greater Serbia. They have been and still remain the 
documents that were to be signed in full compliance of the Paris Peace Agreement, but 
that have no validity according to international law in a sense Serbia wants to, due to the 
fact that one of the signatories, FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) is not, or, has not been the 
UN member at the time they were signed, hence they cannot be deposited with the UN 
Secretary General as it is a rule with other international agreements. The same fate shares 
the Joint Statement made by the Presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, Alija 
Izetbegovic and Slobodan Milosevic respectively upon the initiative of the President 
Jacques Chirac of France. Its content is the same as in the above mentioned agreements. 
Or, to put it another way, they all represent political documents rather than legally 
binding ones as they are understood in the positive international law.
Second issue, which conclusively confirms the political nature of these documents 
relates to the matters of State continuity. The articles 4 and 6 of the Agreements and 
Article 4 of the Joint Statement contain the provisions according to which the Macedonia, 
Croatia and Bosnia - Herzegovina respectively accept or take cognizance of the State 
continuity of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with that of 
former Yugoslavia, and vice versa. This formulation has been interpreted in Serbia itself 
as a crown evidence that it has to do with its State continuity with that of former 
Yugoslavia’s. This is a matter of principle for FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) in the 
desperate need to gather as much a wide support and understanding as it can, not only 
from former Yugoslavia’s republics, but also from the world publ ic .This  stance of
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Serbia has been and still is being strongly rejected not only by most of the international 
community, but also by other former Yugoslav republics, now independent and sovereign 
States, as noted already ”
The Agreements and the Joint Statement start from the assumption of the historical fact 
that Serbia and Montenegro existed in the form of independent States before the creation 
of the former Yugoslavia in 1918, and they entered in that state as international legal 
subjects.Based on this,Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia have registered the 
mere fact of the State continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro). Yet, this does not mean, in any sense, and cannot mean the recognition of 
the sameness of former SFR of Yugoslavia with FRY (Serbia and Montenegro). All states 
that have so far been created upon the dissolution of former Yugoslavia have equal 
rights in its succession, including the issue of State continuity. FRY (Serbia and 
Montenegro) cannot automatically acquire the continuity of former Yugoslavia, neither 
its membership in international organizations nor international agreements. The opposite 
view would run counter to the will of most of today’s international community, as 
already seen, including former Yugoslav republics.^“
6. Is the Autonomous Status Viable and Acceptable Option for Solving the Kosova/o 
Issue
How and in which way will it be possible to arrive at a generally acceptable solution to
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the Kosova/o problem, not only presents a key issue of the Balkans, but of Europe as 
well. Many of the options and suggestions tabled so far, for which we shall discuss in the 
following, are linked with FRY (Serbia and Montenegro). This attitude has its roots in the 
stance of international community as expressed during former Yugoslavia’s dissolution 
and after it. This stance of international community, as earlier seen, to certain extent 
equalizes the Kosova/o issue and the status of the Kosovar Albanians with that of the 
“Republika Srpska” and Serbian people in Bosnia -Herzegovina, which is an unjust 
approach and a big insult for the Kosovar Albanians and its leadership due to their 
peaceful way pursued so far with the view of realizing the right to self-determination, 
meaning independent statehood.
Anyway, this is the present state of affairs regarding the status of Kosova/o and its 
majority population. In this context, there have been some various forms of autonomy, 
short of sovereign statehood, suggested for solving the Kosova/o issue.^^
The first form is granting the autonomy for Kosova/o as in 1974. This is a proposal that is 
most frequently mentioned in circles of the international community, that is, of its most 
powerful members.^*^
The second form has to do with the refederalisation of the FRY (Serbia and 
Montenegro).This means a supplemental or new federalization of the FRY (Serbia and 
Montenegro) making Kosova/o, in addition to Serbia and Montenegro, a separate federal
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unit - that is, a third republic. This is exactly what the Kosovar Albanians had demanded 
in the demonstrations of 1981, but which now, since the dissolution of former 
Yugoslavia, is generally considered as an obsolete requirement. On the Serbian side, this 
option has been supported by the so-called Serbian Resistance Movement of Kosova/o 
led by Momcilo Trajkovic, a former communist leader of Kosova.”
In this paper we do not discuss other sub-forms either of the first group ( “ 1974 
Autonomy - Minus ” or “ 1974 Autonomy - Plus ” ) or the second one ( a proposal for 
an asymmetrical federation,- the case of Adem Dema9 i’s (leader of the Kosova/o’s 
Parliamentary Party) so-called “Balkania Confederation”-, or, the various proposals for 
the regionalization of FRY (Serbia and Montenegro).^* It is enough to note that in all 
these suggestions the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) is a reference point within which to 
settle the Kosova/o issue. The stance is allegedly conditioned by the security concerns 
for the regional and wider stability.
From the Kosovar Albanian standpoint, though, it is unacceptable any solution that is 
short of independent statehood, while security reasons for regional and wider stability, on 
which international community has so far played in its efforts to make the Kosovar 
Albanians accept that sort of solution within RFY (Serbia and Montenegro), are being 
turned against the same international community since the Kosovar Albanians have been 
realizing that if their independence poses a threat to the region and thus should accept that 
status, which they rightly consider as a continuation of their slavery, than why not trying,
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if victims anyway, to show to the international community the both sides of a threat to the 
region’s and wider peaee and stability. The emergence of the “Kosova Liberation Army” 
in the Kosova/o political life at the beginning of 1996 and its widespread support among 
the Kosovar Albanians, especially the youths, is a witness to the above-said reasoning in 
Kosova/o that has been gradually crystallizing.^®
The next reason why the autonomy status, or any similar thereof, is not aceeptable for the 
solution of the Kosova/o issue has to do with the history of the former Yugoslavia itself 
In fact, as we have seen in the previous chapters, Albanians in that state entered not by 
their will but by the force of arms in 1918, after being oeeupied during the Balkan wars 
(1912-13). All the time they were treated as a second-elass citizens, even after granting of 
the autonomy status in 1974. This status did not by far mateh the Kosovar Albanian real 
needs and wishes and was imposed on them according to the communist theory and 
practice of “solving the national question”. Yet, the balanee of power within the former 
Yugoslavia offered some space for Kosova/o’s eeonomic and eultural development and 
political maneuvering, thus allying with the others to counteract Serbia’s hegemony 
actions against Kosova/o.
Now, after the former Yugoslavia destroyed itself and the Kosovar Albanians have 
continuously been experiencing the most brutal repression and terror, it sounds as 
hypocritical and cynizm to speak of “confidence building measures” to bridge the gap 
between the Kosovar Albanians and Serbia, especially after Slobodan Milosevic ’ s
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election as a President of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) in July 1997. The opposition 
in Serbia does not differ from the ruling Socialist Party of Slobodan Milosevic either. The 
last Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Serbia, held on September 1997 and 
boycotted by the Kosovar Albanians, demonstrated that for Serbia to be “democratized” 
via Kosova/o and the “confidence building measures” to work as a step by step strategy 
for solving the issue, it is needed that Kosova/o’s electorate be more than million and a 
half
From the ethnic standpoint, the Albanians in former Yugoslavia as a third biggest nation 
had nothing in common with the South Slavs. If they could not live together in a State 
they themselves formed, why there should be a pressure on the Kosovar Albanians to be 
under Serbia’s hegemony and yoke.
What then remains to be done for solving the Kosova/o issue? First and foremost, its is 
important that international community really evaluates the dangers of the Kosova/o issue 
while pending unresolved. It goes without saying that there is no reason to pressure the 
victims, in this case the Kosovar Albanians, to accept a solution that proved 
ineffective in the past. Instead, it should encourage the peaceful way of the Kosovar 
Albanian leadership in its way to implementing the right to self-determination. Non­
lifting of the “outer wall of sanctions” is one of the means, though not too much effective 
so far, for this encouragement. If Serbia’s leadership proves as intransigent as it did in the 
case of the others at the beginning of the crisis in former Yugoslavia, the “stick” named
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the international recognition of Kosova/o’s independent statehood seems a better solution 
for regional and wider stability than any further pressure for the status of autonomy, 
which in a long run can only prolong solving of the issue properly.
7. Possible Collective Recognition of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) by the UN 
and Its Impact on the Kosova/o Issue
As we have so far seen, at the beginning of 1996 some of the Western European countries 
moved to upgrade the ties with the RFY (Serbia and Montenegro) in compliance with the 
Dayton Peace Agreement and as a gesture of a good will towards FRY (Serbia and 
Montenegro), that is, as a reward for the latter’s contribution in the peace process. This 
was also a part of the relevant UN documents mentioned earlier in this paper regarding 
RFY’s ( Serbia and Montenegro ) treatment as a new state if it fulfilled the same 
conditions for recognition as did other former Yugoslav republics.
This step, though, as noted, has been interpreted by the Kosovar Albanians as something 
dubious, that is, as a policy of rewarding the aggression for the crimes committed in 
the territory of former Yugoslavia and as punishing the victims even further. After the 
Dayton is reached and the individual recognition has been granted by most of 
international community’s members, save the United States,“*® what remains is the lifting 
of the “outer wall of sanctions’’, that is, granting to FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) a 
collective recognition by the UN, most probably upon the request of the former asking for
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a new membership in the UN, as it was the case with former Yugoslav republics 
(integration and not the reintegration). This would mean that FRY (Serbia and 
Montenegro) has to fulfill the same conditions as did other former Yugoslav republics. In 
addition, as already noted, it should fulfill some extra conditions that are the result of 
FRY’s (Serbia and Montenegro) behavior during the time the war was going on in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and including as well its repressive policies in 
Kosova/o.The first set of conditions is related mainly to the territory of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Croatia, that is, to the issue of the war crimes committed in these 
countries, while the second set refers to the rule of law, democracy, respect for human 
rights and the rights of minorities, including the solving of the Kosova/o issue.'" The way 
to solving the Kosova/o issue can be through solving some of its acute problems 
(education, health care etc.) by initiating and strengthening of the so-called confidence 
building measures, as it is being recently preached by most of the international 
community , or by directly insisting on solving the status of Kosova/o itself, a stance 
preached before and after the Dayton.42 Both cases are comprised in the notion “outer 
wall of sanctions” that has already been under the discussion.
If the UN decides to lift the “outer wall of sanctions”, that is, the UN security Council 
proposes to the General Assembly the admission of RFY (Serbia and Montenegro) to the 
UN, taking into consideration only the UN Charter provisions that a State to be admitted 
must be a pace-loving and as the witness thereof would serve the Dayton’s signing, 
without taking into account the plight of Kosova/o’s majority population and their right
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to self-determination, than it would be a big blow to the principles of peace and 
justice.This,in turn,may push the Kosovar Albanians into unpredictable adventures, since 
their status within FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) as a national minority, although by far 
larger then Montenegrins and in a State where more than 30 per cent of it are not South 
Slavs, would put them back into the 1918, or in 1987. In fact, it will be fulfilled the 
speculation that everything started in Kosova/o and it is there it will finish. This can be 
prevented by international community, or, it may be that the lessons learnt from the past 
events in former Yugoslavia have not been on purpose read properly.
-92-
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION
1. The origins of Yugoslavia’s break-up lies in the very act of its creation in 1918 as well 
as in the way it was ran all the time until the dissolution (1992). The act of its formation 
in 1918 has been arbitrary one and contrary to the liberal concepts and ideals of its 
northern parts (Slovenia and Croatia). The rest of its part in the South and Center had 
quite different views on the State, that is, being dominated by Serbia they cultivated an 
integralist-unitarist view of on the common state, while Slovenes and Croats nourished 
hopes for an (con) federal-type of its political and state apparatus.
Besides this, the others that were not defined as its constituent nations, that is, all but 
Slovenes, Croats and Serbs were treated as second-class citizens, while some non-Slavic 
populations were not regarded even as minorities. This was the case with Albanians. 
Kosova/o and Albanians as a whole were the most discriminated in the pre-War 
Yugoslavia.
After the War, though, Albanians were recognized as nationality (minority) and Kosova/o 
was granted a status of “political and territorial” autonomy within the Federal Serbia. 
This administrative-constitutional status of Kosova/o had as its aim the very denial of the 
existence of the Albanian nation within that state. The “political-territorial” autonomy of 
Kosova/o widened markedly in 1974, when it was granted all prerogatives of the
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republic, although without being raised to the full republican status as the others. It 
offered to Kosova/o and Albanians a wide range of political, social, economic and 
cultural rights and opportunities for their further development. It also gave a chance for 
Kosova/o and its majority population to be a part of balance-of-power game within 
former Yugoslavia, yet always sacrificed by the Slavic republics of former Yugoslavia. 
The autonomy was abolished in 1989, after Milosevic came to power in the nationalistic 
euphoria raised by him in Serbia of the 1980s.
After Milosevic abolished Kosova/o’s autonomy in 1989, there started a new offensive 
against the north, that is, against Slovenia and Croatia that eventually ended in its central 
part by the mid of 1992 (aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina). At the outset, other former 
Yugoslavia’s republics were for its transformation into a loose (con) federation, a stance 
opposed by Serbia. The latter endorsed only a centralist-type Yugoslavia ( Spring 1991). 
When these talks failed, Serbia continued its policies with violent means, that is, by 
conducting the war against those opposing it. This policy had been prepared by Serbia 
immediately after Tito’s death. Inertive response of international community towards 
Serbia’s aims offered Milosevic a wide opportunity to attack one by one other republics, 
first Slovenia, than Croatia and,most disastrously, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Initial response 
of international community was to weak and the than EC Conference on Yugoslavia 
proved to be as illusory as that held in London in 1992. It would take three years and a 
half of the war of destruction. It stopped, though, only after a strong and coordinated 
diplomatic and military action of the Western countries against Serbia the Dayton Peace
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of 1995). Anyway, it should be admitted that international community by setting up its 
criteria for solving the crisis, gave clear signals to Serbs that it would not allow any 
legalization of their policy of ethnic cleansing and genocide as a means of achieving the 
political goals, that is, the creation of Greater Serbia. The so-called “Guidelines on 
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union” (EU, 16 December 
1991) are the comer stone in preventing these obscure efforts of Serbia and Milosevic.
These Guidelines offered a reference point for the Western countries regarding the 
recognition of independent statehood of the new state-type entities. Yet, they did not 
recognize new changes in borders that were as a result of the uses of force, as it was the 
case with the so-called “Republika Srpska Krajina” (Croatia) and “Republika Srpska” 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina). The bad fact is that they equalized the case of these entities with 
that of Kosova/o and its majority population. In Kosova/o, after the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia started, its majority population and the states structures (Kosova/o’s 
Assembly and the Government) declared Kosova/o as a republic on par with the others in 
former Yugoslavia (Declaration of 2 July 1990 and the Constitution of September 1990 
respectively). Based on these acts, Kosova/o held its referendum on independence in 
September 1991 and asked for international recognition of its independent statehood. The 
request of Kosova/o, submitted on 20 December 1991, was not met with positively by the 
than EC Conference on Yugoslavia, most probably due to its government’s lack of 
effective control over the territory and majority population. This is why there can be no
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comparison with the Kosova/o case and that of Serbian entities created violently in 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina by ethnically cleansing all the non-Serbs. Kosova/o’s 
leadership peaceful way to achieve its political goals can in no way be compared with the 
above cases. Besides this, Kosova/o had its defined territory and population at the time of 
dissolution of former Yugoslavia, but the security reasons mattered too much for its non­
recognition as an independent State.
2. After the collapse of the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia as a result of the events on 
the ground (aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina and the intensification of the war in 
Croatia), international community involved itself in the crisis more deeper than before. 
To this effect, it convened in London the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia 
(ICFY, August, 1992), which was meant to be binding on the parties. Yet it also ended in 
failure as a result of the West’s reluctance to tackle the crisis seriously and prevent the 
Serbian aggression. It preserved the same basic principles as the Hague Conference (non­
use of force as a means of achieving political gains, territorial integrity of former 
Yugoslav republics, respect for human and minority rights, democracy and the rule of law 
etc.). Within this conference, there were formed a Special Group on Kosova/o to tackle 
the issue on par with that of other groups not entitled to independent statehood. The 
work of the London Conference, it should be noted, was based on the previous work of 
the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia, so that almost all structures were preserved, as it 
had been the case with the Badinter Commission (previously named as Committee).
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The first evolution and the change in the attitude of international community occurred 
regarding the holding of referendums for independence on the side of former Yugoslav 
republics wishing independence. This criteria was not required in the “Guidelines”. Based 
on this, Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina held their referendums as well and 
declared their republics although they were not in majority at the time and lacked clear 
territorial base and its compactness. This was achieved later by ethnically cleansing all 
the non-Serbs. No-changes in borders, democracy and the rule of law, respect for human 
and minority rights were the same as in the previous conference (the Hague Conference 
on Yugoslavia). Those entitled to self-determination were former Yugoslav republics 
only that had effective control over their territory and the date of their independence 
varied from one republic to the other. An)way, former Yugoslavia’s break-up was 
deemed as over and completed as of Summer 1992, according to Badinter opinions.
The statehood of Kosova/o was denied although it declared the independence and asked 
for its international recognition on 20 December 1991, as required by the “Guidelines”. In 
literature and the scholarly work on the issue this denial of Kosova/o’s international 
recognition has been justified on the ground of its government lacking of effective 
control over the territory of Kosova/o. There have as well been comparisons of 
Kosova/o’s case with those of “Srpska Krajina” (Croatia) and “Republika Srpska” 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina), which we deem as inappropriate ones for Kosova/o has had since 
the time immemorial its own clear territorial base. Its path for independent statehood has 
been a peaceful and civilized one, and has been encouraged by the international
-97-
community as such. The Badinter Commission did not mention Kosova/o within those 
entities entitled to self-determination, though. Yet, it has to certain extent equalized it 
with all other cases of ethnic communities living within former Yugoslav republics and 
which are entitled to the so-called internal right to self-determination, short of 
independent statehood. This approach of Badinter is, it should be noted, not a principled 
one for its leaves “ripe” for ethnic cleansing all the others living within former republican 
borders. Elimination of any opportunity for border changes closes any possibility for their 
readjustment in a case where there is a very little chance the Balkans leaders would 
accept any relinquishment of territory in a peaceful way. This hold true especially with 
Serbia’s leadership and its justification of their right to self-determination: In some cases 
their arguments are based on history (Kosova/o), in others in fait accompli (Bosnia- 
Herzegovina) or in the ethnic composition of a given territory (Vojvodina). The questions 
addressed by Serbia to the Badinter Commission asking whether the boundaries of 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were international borders showed the very logic of 
double standards that Serbia was going to pursue, even by force, in the days to come on 
the eve of the w ars. In sum , the uti possidetis principle, as applied in former 
Yugoslavia, may cause a serious problems in the future, as it has already been causing, 
for its application in the past has been related only to small portions of frontiers’ belt and 
regarding mountains areas, thus living outside them only unnoticeable part of the 
population and territory.
3. After the Dayton Peace was reached in November of 1995, an “outer wall” of sanctions
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was instituted against Serbia. It was meant to discipline Serbia ’ s behavior not only 
regarding the issue of its cooperation with the Was Crimes Tribunal, but as well 
regarding the Kosova/o issue and Belgrade’s repressive policies against Kosova/o’s 
majority population. Its content is related to FRY ‘s (Serbia and Montenegro) 
membership in international organizations and financial help to reconstruct its shattered 
economy as a result of the economic sanctions against it imposed during 1992-1995.
The impact of the “outer wall” of sanctions on solving the Kosova/o issue has so far been 
minor. There have been signed an Education Agreement on September 1996 and 
eventually some sort of dialogue between the opposition parties and the Kosovar 
Albanians started (in New York and Ul9 in/Ulcinj respectively, 1997). Yet, this was not 
enough for Kosovar Albanians, who have been disappointed after RFY (Serbia and 
Montenegro) received individual recognition by most of EU member States and the rest 
of international community at the beginning of 1996. At this time, there started to 
crystallize a new logic within the Kosovar Albanians independence movement, that 
is, that the force and arms are the only that count if they is to be achieved independence 
from Serbia. The appearance of the clandestine Kosova Liberation Army in the political 
scene of Kosova/o is a witness to this. It is a advantageous, though, that collective 
recognition of FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) has not as yet been endorsed, which may be 
a good means for pressure against FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) to start negotiating with 
the Kosovar Albanians leadership in order to solve the crisis there.
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One of the most important issues and the oldest one in Serbia’s political discourse has 
been that of State continuity. Namely, ever since its creation in 1918, in Serbia proper 
there have been an attitude according to which the newly formed State was a continuation 
of former Serbian Kingdom.This stance has been maintained even after former 
Yugoslavia’s dissolution in 1992, but is not supported by the rest of international 
community, including former Yugoslav republics, now independent States. After the 
Dayton Peace, Serbia has been striving to gather support of former Yugoslav republics 
and the rest of international community for its State-continuity stance with former 
Yugoslavia. Yet, the others are reluctant to accept this for it would have a serious 
implications regarding their rights and duties as new international subjects. FRY (Serbia 
and Montenegro) should fulfill the same criteria as the others in order to obtain its 
collective recognition and there cannot be a mere reintegration of this state into 
international community as if it were the same legal subject as former Yugoslavia used to 
be.
Solving of the Kosova/o issue by granting a sort of autonomous status similar to that 
enjoyed in 1974, is not a solution to the problem. Unfortunately, this approach until very 
recently has been accepted and endorsed by the EU member States. This is an insult for 
Kosova/o’s peaceful leadership and a blow to international community’s principles for a 
peaceful and civilized solution of disputes. It is unlikely that the regional stability could 
be better preserved if Kosova/o is granted an autonomous status within Serbia or FRY 
(Serbia and Montenegro) and the ongoing events there prove th is. It can be only a
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temporary solution, which in a long run would destabilize the whole region and wider.
The only viable solution, in our view, is to grant Kosova/o a similar status to that of 
former Yugoslavia’s republics. This may not be achieved at once and some temporary 
“confidence building” measures between Kosovar Albanians and the Belgrade regime, 
including Serbs living in Kosova/o, are needed to facilitate the path towards Kosova/o’s 
full independent statehood.
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that Macedonian politicians would never accept. To this Gligorov’s statement we would 
add only that not only Macedonian politicians, but all of the former Yugoslav republics 
and the rest of international community will never accept such an attitude of Serbia. Cf. 
ODRAZ B92 vesti, 110697/1 (English). B92 Open Serbia, Belgrade. November 6, 1997. 
Also available in Internet: htpp://www.siicom.com/odrazb;htpp://www. b92 eng. opennet. 
org.
See, brilliant comments on these issues, by the Bosniac Ambassador in Zagreb, prof.dr. 
Kasim Tmka. Zagreb,10 October 1996.Text provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry 
in Tirana-Albania. For the opposite view, which is at the same time the official one of the 
FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) authorities, see, Simic, Yugoslav Foreign Policy 107-143. 
Compare especially the literature, including that of the author, quoted in that work.This 
shows the current public opinion in Serbia’s scientific circles on the issue, which is quite 
the opposite one from the rest of international community as a whole.
The mere fact that there have not as yet been established diplomatic relations between 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and FRY (Serbia and Montenegro), speaks of itself for the fact that 
the latter is not the state continuity with the former Yugoslavia. Besides this, FRY (Serbia 
and Montenegro) has been urging Bosnia - Herzegovina to take back the indictment
-140-
against it that has been going on since 1993 before the International Court of Justice in 
the Hague. “Nasa-Borba” 28 October 1997. Also available in Internet: http.www. 
yurope.com/zines/nasa-borba
C f Zoran Lutovac, Options for Solution of the Problem of Kosova/o. “International 
Affairs” No.1056. Belgrade, 15 May 1997 pp.10-14; Dimitros Triantaphollou, Kosovo 
Today: Is there no Way Out of the Deadlock? “European Security” Vol. 5 No.2 Summer 
1996 p. 292.
The Special Group on Kosovo acting within the Working Group on Ethnic and 
National Minorities of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), under 
Ambassador Gerht Ahrens, set up on 3 September 1992, worked out, for the first time, an 
autonomy solution for Kosova/o based on the 1974 Constitution and the experience of 
South Tyrol, Spain, the Aland Islands, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. But its was not 
thought advisable to try to impose a solution, although this case represents the first 
official “autonomy offer” on behalf of Kosova’o made by the international community. 
Cf. Hugh Poulton, The Rest of the Balkans. In Hugh Miall (ed.). Minority Rights in 
Europe: The Scope for Transitional Regime. (C) 1994 by Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, p.72.
”  Karl Bildt: Kosova/o Should Have the same Status as Montenegro. Statement in the 
Daily Report No. 1736 of the Kosova Information Center (in Albanian). Prishtina, 3 June
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1997 p.4; Momcilo Trajkovic, the leader of “Serbian Resistance Movement” in Kosova’o, 
has in several occasions asked for Kosova/o to be a third republic within FRY (Serbia and 
Montenegro). If this is not accepted by the Kosovar Albanians than, according to 
Trajkovic, it should be followed by the military intervention against the Kosovar 
Albanians.Cf. “Kosova Information Center”. Daily Report No. 1945 (in Albanian). 
Prishtina, 20 January 1997 pp.10-11.
38 Cf. Lutovac, op. cit. 10-14.
39 Cf. Tirana based Albanian newspaper “Rilindja” from 16 to 20 July, 1997.
“The United States Does Not Recognize FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) as the Sole 
Successor to the Former Yugoslavia. “Rilindja”, 1 October 1997 p. 7; “Madeline Olbright 
Says that Kosova/o is one of the Conditions for the Full Normalisation of the Relations 
with Belgrade”. In Daily Report No. 1735 of the Kosova Informations Center. Prishtina, 
2 June 1997 p. 2.; “ The mere faets that we do not lift the “Outer Wall” of sanctions and 
do not have as yet the diplomatic relations with Belgrade, shows that we are not in 
support of Milosevic’s policy”. Statement by Robert Gelbard, the US President’s Special 
Envoy for the Balkans, made at the Press Conference in Podgorica during his visit in 
Montenegro on 12 January 1998. “ Radio and Television of Montenegro”. Evening 
News, 7.30h p.m. CET (in Serbian only);Also, in the Internet edition of the “Washington
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Post”, there can be found the following: “ The territory administered by the Belgrade 
government calls itself ‘Yugoslavia’ but is more commonly referred to as ‘Serbia’ or 
‘rump Yugoslavia’.Cf.http://www. wpl.washingtonpo.../T_ONE=l&Country= Serbia
For the issue of war crimes in former Yugoslavia, see, Theodor Meron, The Case for 
War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia. “Foreign Affairs” Vol. 72 No. 3 Summer 1993 pp. 
122-135; David Binders, Anatomy of a Massacre. “Foreign Policy” No. 97 Winter 1994- 
95, pp. 70-79; Alfred de Zayas, The Right to One’s Homeland, Ethnic Cleansing, and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. “Criminal Law Forum” 
Vol.6. No.2., 1995; Patric Thombery, Saving the War Crimes Tribunal. “Foreign Policy” 
No. 104 Fall 1996; Theodor Meron, Answering for War Crimes. “Foreign Affairs” Vol. 
76 No. 1 January/February 1997, pp.2-9.
Cf. Rene Gabriel Hymer., Kosova/o After the Dayton. In the Second International 
Conference entitled “The Balkans After the Dayton”, held in Tirana from 14 to 16 
December 1996. Reprinted in Tirana based Albanian newspaper “Balli i Kombit”, 16 
.lanuary 1997, p.8; “Rilindja” (Tirana): 13 February 1997, p. 5; 12 December 1997 p. 1 & 
6; 16 December 1997, p. 4; 19 December 1997, p.4; 31 December 1997 p. 1; 11 January 
1998, p. 1; Prishtina based Albanian newspaper “Koha Ditore”, 10 January 1998.
The so-called “confidence building measures” were firstly made public by the than Head 
of the Office of the High Representative for Bosnia - Herzegovina during a briefing with
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the Albanian Permanent Mission to the European Union in Brussels on 7 August 1996. 
The full text No. 266/ 96 of the same date provided to the author by the Albanian Foreign 
Ministry, Tirana-Albania.
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